



# Exercise RAUORA II (Auckland) Post Exercise Report

---



# Contents

---

<b>1</b>	<b>Executive Summary</b> .....	<b>3</b>
<b>2</b>	<b>Introduction</b> .....	<b>5</b>
2.1	Background .....	5
2.2	Exercise Management .....	6
2.3	Aim, objectives, and key performance indicators.....	7
2.4	Scope .....	7
2.5	Participating organisations.....	8
2.6	Timeline of events .....	8
<b>3</b>	<b>Evaluation</b> .....	<b>9</b>
3.1	Exercise Planning .....	9
3.2	Exercise Conduct .....	9
3.3	Exercise Evaluation Against Objectives / KPI's .....	9
3.4	Participant feedback .....	15
<b>4</b>	<b>Conclusion</b> .....	<b>17</b>
<b>5</b>	<b>Summary of Recommendations</b> .....	<b>18</b>
<b>6</b>	<b>Appendix 1: Exercise Objectives and KPIs</b> .....	<b>20</b>
<b>7</b>	<b>Appendix 2: Exercise Arrangements</b> .....	<b>22</b>

# 1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

---

This was the sixth exercise held in the RAUORA II series. The Rauora II Exercise Series is a ‘walk’ level, table-top, exercise, delivered using dynamic simulation to control the scenario.

The exercise is designed to test an inter-agency response to the lifesaving aspects of a Mass Rescue Operation, within a Police District. It is a learning activity designed to educate agencies on the assembly of appropriate management groups, the application and management of available information, the allocation of scarce resources, and decision making on response actions.

The scenario involved a cruise ship with approximately 3,000 people on board which reported a fire on board, a few kilometres north east of Waiheke Island. A mayday was declared and an evacuation of the ship was ordered.

The exercise began when all participants were advised that a Mayday had been declared and that it had already been recognised as a Mass Rescue Operation (MRO). Police Communications and the Rescue Coordination Centre NZ (RCCNZ) had already agreed that it would be a CAT II Search and Rescue.

The Auckland District Police established an EOC at the District Police HQ. A Casualty Clearing Point (CCP), and Civil Defence Centre (CDC) were set up in separate rooms within the Auckland Emergency Management EOC, a venue near the District HQ. Due to operational restraints, RCCNZ did not set up their own IMT in Avalon (Wellington); instead two RCCNZ representatives simulated the part of RCCNZ from Auckland.

The exercise ran from approximately 1000h to 1400h, and upon completion hot debriefs were held in each area, followed by a group debrief for all participants.

Feedback from the exercise evaluators and participants, have been captured. The summary of the recommendations from the feedback process are:


- For ease of understanding of terminology, CIMS titles should be used in an operation. (i.e.: deployment manager could be put under the Logistics title).
- With the potential future one DCC in Tamaki Makaurau consideration needs to be given to both having sufficient capacity in the room and staffing to be able to run a much larger DCC and a major event simultaneously. If not already considered the new alternative National Crisis Management Centre in Auckland may be a suitable location
- A written IAP is required to ensure that there is no confusion on what needs to be completed going forward into the next few hours, days, and weeks.
- An IAP template, and a system to record and track the tasks from it, should be included in the MRO plan.
- Planning was linked with Logistics in the exercise but sits as a separate role in the MRO plan. Planning should be a separate role
- The EOC RCCNZ liaison position should be reflected in the MRO plan
- A risk mitigation plan should be put into place. A system should be put into place to formally record, mitigate and action risks.
- Using the screens in the EOC to display information would be helpful for people walking into the EOC.
- A distribution list for circulating information from the EOC should be created.

- Jerkins worn in the EOC need to be updated to reflect CIMS 2<sup>nd</sup> edition. The role should also be displayed on the front (not just the back) and a clear plastic slot in the front to allow a name tag to be inserted would be useful so that you have a name for the person you are speaking to.
- The innovative information gathering technique presented in the plan was tested and worked well. Consider testing it in a full deployment exercise.
- The ability to monitor marine, fire and ambulance channels from the EOC could help with situational awareness
- Update template for Communications plan
- Develop photos and/or video to enhance exercise experience

## 2 INTRODUCTION

The Rauora II Exercise Series is a ‘walk’ level exercise delivered as a table-top exercise by using a dynamic simulation to control the scenario. The exercise is designed to test an inter-agency response to the lifesaving aspects of a Mass Rescue Operation, within a Police District. It is a learning activity designed to educate agencies on the assembly of appropriate management groups, the application and management of available information, the allocation of scarce resources, and decision making on response actions.

The Exercise Controller was responsible for the overall conduct and control of the exercise. The exercise was coordinated via an Exercise Control cell (EXCON) utilising a Higher Exercise Control (HICON) and a Lower Exercise Control (LOCON), as illustrated in the diagram below.



Detail of the exercise arrangements for participants, and control arrangements for the white cell members, can be found at Appendix 2.

### 2.1 Background

The scenario for the exercise involved a cruise ship with approximately 3,000 people on board which reported a fire on board, near Waiheke Island. A mayday was declared and an evacuation of the ship was ordered.

The exercise was held on Tuesday, 7 November 2017. The locations for the exercise were:

- Police Auckland District Headquarters, Cook Street, Auckland
- Auckland Emergency Management, 24 Wellesley Street, Auckland Central

## 2.2 Exercise Management

---

<b>Exercise Controller:</b>	Carl van der Meulen, NZSAR
<b>Dynamic Simulation Manager:</b>	Dave Greenberg, Emergency Preparedness Services
<b>HICON:</b>	Duncan Ferner, NZSAR (at Police EOC)
<b>LOCON:</b>	Rhett Emery, NZSAR
<b>EOC Evaluator:</b>	Marc Paynter (PNHQ)
<b>OSC/CCP/CDC Evaluator:</b>	Kevin Banaghan (RCCNZ)

## 2.3 Aim, objectives, and key performance indicators

---

**Aim:** To test arrangements for responding to mass rescue incidents within the Police District.

**Objectives:** The exercise objectives are taken from NEP National Objectives (NO) 1, 5, 6, 9, modified to be relevant for mass rescue operations:

1. Lead a coordinated interagency response to a mass rescue incident
5. Effectively manage information horizontally and vertically
6. Deliver effective public information management
9. Further develop collaborative relationships, to enhance interagency knowledge and understanding; creating capability and resilience

**KPIs:** A table of the exercise objectives, training objectives, and KPIs can be found in Appendix 1.

## 2.4 Scope

---

The following activities fall inside the scope of the exercise:

Determining inter-agency coordination responsibilities.

Initial coordination activities.

The search and rescue phase of an MRO event (i.e. rescue, shore-side coordination, reconciliation, welfare arrangements).

The escalation and notification processes for MRO events.

The following activities fall outside the scope of the exercise:

Whole of government response arrangements (DES, ODESC etc.)

Non search and rescue phases of MRO events (i.e. pollution response, mass fatalities, investigation, recovery etc.)

## 2.5 Participating organisations

---

Approximately 50 people from the following agencies took part in the exercise:

Maritime NZ

Auckland Emergency Management

Auckland Harbourmaster

Auckland Regional Council

NZ Coastguard

NZ Defence Force

NZ Police Auckland Districts

NZSAR

Police National Headquarters

RCCNZ

St John Ambulance

## 2.6 Timeline of events

---

0930-1000	Exercise brief
1000-1400	Table top exercise
1400-1415	Hot debrief in each group
1430-1500	Group hot debrief

## 3 EVALUATION

---

### 3.1 Exercise Planning

---

A review was held by the exercise planning team following the Exercise and the following points were raised:

- Starting the exercise after the CAT 2/MRO decision was already made works well. Police still have ability to change to CAT 1 if desired
- The Master Events List worked well
- Pictures of the cruise ship sinking are needed to enhance the exercise
- A better communications plan would be useful for the exercise

### 3.2 Exercise Conduct

---

A review was held by the exercise planning team following the Exercise and the following points were raised:

- RCCNZ did not have as much situational awareness in this exercise due to information not being passed to them from the Marine Assets coordinator in EXCON
- RCCNZ and Police Liaison's at the exercise location works okay, but having RCCNZ operating from Avalon would be more beneficial

### 3.3 Exercise Evaluation Against Objectives / KPI's

---

The exercise evaluators in the EOC and RCCNZ evaluated their part of the exercise against the KPI list.

Each KPI can be:

- Achieved
- Partially Achieved
- Not Achieved

Evaluator comments are also summarised.

### 3.3.1 Objective 1: Lead a coordinated interagency response to a mass rescue incident

KPI	Achieved? EOC	Evaluator Comments
1.1.1 Coordinating authorities identify incident as a mass rescue event and activate the 'Mass Rescue Operations Response Plan'	Achieved	The exercise briefing established this was a mass rescue event.
1.1.2 Coordinating authorities determine if the incident is a Category 1 or Category 2 SAR	Achieved	The exercise had predetermined that the RCC would become the coordinator of the on-water search activities after talking to the Police Northern Communications Centre. This occurred without consultation with the Local Controller.
1.1.3 The National Security System is activated (notionally)	Achieved	The EOC notified the NCCC to enable this to occur and the establishment of the RIOD site meant that information by the NCCC to feed the NSS was in place.
1.2.1 The lead agency activates a coordination centre at the EOC level to take operational level lead of the mass rescue response	Achieved	<p>Police established the lead with the RCCNZ coordinating the search and rescue part of the operation. A conference call to the RCCNZ was made that involved the Local Controller, Chief of Staff and Operations Manager. This call defined very clear roles and responsibilities setting a very good understanding of exactly who was responsible for what.</p> <p>A command chart was quickly produced and responsibilities identified. Deployment was a function identified early to ensure that staff were deployed to the various locations. This was a good use of a day to day function and aligned with the flexibility under CIMS. For ease of understanding of terminology, this could be put under the CIMS Logistics title. There are very good arrangements in place to handover the Auckland City District Command Centre business-as-usual work to Counties-Manukau and Waitemata. With the potential future one DCC in Tamaki Makaurau consideration needs to be given to both having sufficient capacity in the room and staffing to be able to run a much larger DCC <u>and</u> a major event simultaneously. If not already considered the new alternative National Crisis Management Centre in Auckland may be a suitable location</p>
1.2.2 RCCNZ escalates to an MRO response as per SOPs	Achieved	This was completed by EXCON early and the EOC established.
1.2.3 Casualty Clearing Point(s) (landing zones) are identified	Achieved	Landing sites were identified based on some good discussion with the RCC and EOC on whether Matiatia or Onetangi would be used. This concluded with Matiatia as the selected Landing Zone.
1.2.4 Civil Defence Centre(s) is notionally established for welfare arrangements	Achieved	The Spark Arena was identified as the CDC. This is a very suitable location.

<p>1.2.5 Other coordination centres as required (e.g. DVI, Health) are identified by the EOC (and will be role played by EXCON once notionally activated)</p>	<p>Achieved</p>	<p>DVI was identified by the EOC as a required role. There was also very good engagement around which hospitals to send passengers/crew to indicating a good coordination with Health was in place. Staging and Assembly areas were set up at the Marine Rescue Centre for the 19 NCOs and 122 Constables that were identified by Deployment for assignment to the operation.</p>
<p>1.3.1 An operational level Incident Action Plan is developed by the EOC</p>	<p>Partially Achieved</p>	<p>The Incident Action Plan existed in the minds of the people involved and there was a clear aim of the response work being carried out. However this needs to be put into a written IAP as it will allow for ensuring that there is no confusion on what needs to be completed going forward into the next few hours, days, and weeks. An IAP is also very important for shift handovers and informing people outside the EOC exactly what is being done, needs to be done, and will be done. It may be useful to provide an IAP template in the MRO plan as well as a system to record and track tasks arising from it. This could be as simple as a excel spreadsheet recording the tasks or using RIOD.</p>
<p>1.3.2 Planning processes are followed by the lead agency as established in SOPs and the 'Mass Rescue Operations Response Plan'</p>	<p>Partially Achieved</p>	<p>Planning was linked with Logistics under the command chart, yet sits as separate roles in the plan (see page 23,24). The demands of Logistics meant that planning was very light. While Operations run the rescue, they should be doing so in accordance with the developed IAP. To reiterate, the response was very good, it just needs to be linked and recorded by Planning. This will allow the operations to continue in a structured way beyond the initial response and allow Planning to drive the direction of the operation.</p>
<p>1.3.3 Other coordinating centres develop Incident Action Plans as appropriate (RCCNZ, Welfare)</p>	<p>Achieved</p>	<p>The Welfare plan was completed. The RCC plan was carried out by RCCNZ members in EXCON.</p>
<p>1.3.4 Threats and associated risks are embedded in the action plans</p>	<p>Not Achieved</p>	<p>There was no formal risk mitigation plan in place. What would happen if the ocean swell increased, how would controls be put on responding vessels? There was no system in place to formally record, mitigate and action risks. Health and Safety is a role shown in the plan but no resource was allocated to this role therefore it is difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of this position.</p>
<p>1.4.1 The response is managed in accordance with the 'Mass Rescue Operations Response Plan'</p>	<p>Achieved</p>	<p>Immediately the MRO plan was referred to in the exercise. The Command chart from the plan was replicated on the whiteboard. A gap in the plan that was covered operationally was the RCCNZ liaison person. This was completed by a member of the Maritime Unit within the EOC. This position and its description should be reflected in the MRO Plan.</p>
<p>1.4.2 Liaison arrangements are maintained as required and in accordance with the 'Mass Rescue Operations Response Plan'</p>	<p>Achieved</p>	<p>There was good liaison interaction with an Inspector dedicated to supporting them. The intelligence products were good at keeping them informed. As the ship was on fire a FENZ representative would have been useful to have available to provide technical advice. The liaison was overall very well completed and there was certainly harmony across all teams allowing for some good honest discussions and decisions based on all available information.</p>

1.4.3 The systems, processes, and resources are appropriate for implementing the action plan	Partially Achieved	The processes and systems worked well although they were light due to the exercise conditions. This is expected, however there was good consideration of what would be achieved in a real situation such as more detail in intelligence reports. There was good thought on these matters by the team. The IAP was light in detail and worked more as an add-on rather than influencing the direction of the operation.
1.4.4 Situational awareness is gained and maintained	Achieved	The situational awareness was good. The use of RIOD was good. Briefings were held hourly. Using the screens in the EOC more would be helpful. A good indicator of situational awareness is if a new shift walked in the room they could look at the walls/screens, read the latest intelligence report and IAP, and have a very good understanding of what is going on without having to ask many questions.
1.4.5 Lead agency delegates tasks to support agencies in accordance with established plans (some support agencies will be role played by EXCON)	Achieved	The Local Controller delegated responsibility to agencies as required i.e. RCCNZ, Ambulance and Civil Defence. This was done early and ensured that there was lack of overlap between the CDC, CCP, RCCNZ and EOC.
1.4.6 Agencies carry out delegated tasks in accordance with SOPs	Achieved	Each agency worked well to execute their plans.

### 3.3.2 Objective 5: Effectively manage information horizontally and vertically

KPI	Achieved? EOC	Evaluator Comments
5.1.1 A communications plan is developed and implemented	Partially Achieved	No formal plan was developed however there was good communication across the various agencies, primarily due to the dedicated Police person assigned to the role of managing the liaison people. No distribution lists for circulating information were created.
5.1.2 Provision of timely, accurate, and clear information to those who need it	Achieved	During the exercise the communication was very good and situational awareness was provided primarily through the log and hourly briefings. The briefings were short and clear fulfilling the need to communicate key matters without being too long. They were well run.
5.1.3 Accurate information is communicated within and across agencies in a timely manner using established ICT arrangements	Achieved	All agencies were able to access their own systems due to their agency standalone systems. Communications is a common problem in exercises and real operations. Having the log on the large screen was very useful to the exercise participants
5.2.1 Requests for support are effectively managed	Achieved	A very good example of the deconfliction of resources came about where NZDF assets were available but how they were actually tasked was structured i.e. Major assets are authorised through JFHQ who is guided by the Local Controller. All other NZDF assets are at the disposal through Local control. This clear support structure removed any ambiguity on who can authorise what.

**3.3.3 Objective 6: Deliver effective public information information**

<b>KPI</b>	<b>Achieved? EOC</b>	<b>Evaluator Comments</b>
6.1.1 Public information / messaging is coordinated and consistent across agencies	Achieved	Press releases were created and approved within the EOC. They were of high quality and avoided ambiguity. Having the PIM person in the EOC would have made their work easier as they would have had more access to what was happening, although they can work more remotely if sitreps, logs and intel reports are of high quality and regularly released.
6.1.2 Messages align with and support the operational response	Partially Achieved	See above. There could have been messages produced to tell people to avoid the use of a road, or to keep out of an area; however with one person responsible for PIM on the exercise this was not achievable. In reality the NCCC PIM team would have arrived and worked with the local PIM on the response.

**3.3.4 Objective 9: Further develop collaborative relationships, to enhance interagency knowledge and understanding; creating capability and resilience**

KPI	Achieved? EOC	Evaluator Comments
9.1.1 Insights from the MRO exercise are shared with all relevant agencies	Achieved	The inclusion of agencies who would respond to the emergency is one critical aspect of the exercise that will enable the team to work cohesively if such a mass rescue operation occurs. Hot debriefs were held and there are several aspects that were identified for remedying.

Other observations from Exercise Evaluator:

	Topic	Comment
1.	Jerkins and roles	Members of the team in the EOC did not wear jerkins to identify their roles. It is recommended that jerkins be purchased to match the current CIMS 2 <sup>nd</sup> edition and their associated colours. The role should also be displayed on the front (not just the back) and a clear plastic slot in the front to allow a name tag to be inserted would be useful so that you have a name for the person you are speaking to.
2.	Communications	Liaison Officers were able to access their own computer systems thanks to access to their own systems. This was excellent to see and with situation reports, maps, plans etc. being electronic this is critical.
3.	Reconciliation	International best practice says that reconciliation should occur at the CDC, not at the CCP, as was done in the exercise. However, had it been performed at the CDC, the innovative information gathering technique presented in the plan was tested (see p18 and Appendix D of the plan) proved to be a good solution that I would encourage further testing at a full deployment exercise. The process involved photographing people with their name etc. displayed and writing R on the hand when registered. This looks very promising for a national rollout for all MRO plans. The capacity showed to be around 20 people per hour per constable. This process could also be useful at a smaller scale event, for example a bus crash, where the MRO plan is not used.
4.	Risk	There was no formal way for activities to be considered against risk and controls put in place to mitigate that risk, and then be approved by the Local Controller. Any MRO event will lead to risks that need to be mitigated e.g risk – waves, small vessels may overturn; mitigation – only vessels 6m + should be used to travel to the cruise ship to assist with rescue.
5.	Radio Comms	There was a lack of radio communications available for monitoring. Being able to monitor Marine Channel 16, Police radio and air radio would assist with situational awareness. Consideration could also be given to Fire and Ambulance radios in the EOC also. Consideration of using the shared emergency channels installed on Emergency Services VHF radios should be made. Installation and testing of other emergency channels may also be considered, prior to emergencies developing.
6.	Final Comments	I am confident that the response to the mass rescue of the people aboard the cruise ship would have been successful in limiting loss of life and ensuring that people's welfare is maintained after rescue. There was a very high level of skill and experience across all teams. The key points from the exercise that require some work is the need to improve the planning phase of the operation and to document and record everything for the future investigations. The key successes were the innovative reconciliation method, and the fact that the people involved were highly skilled in their roles.

## 3.4 Participant feedback

---

An email was sent to all participants asking for feedback via an online (Survey Monkey) survey. All feedback was to be made anonymous in the final document.

19 people (out of approximately 60 participants) completed the online survey and a sample of their responses follow.

### Questions asked and summary of responses:

Q1. Which part of the exercise did you participate in?

- EOC/DCC - 9 people
- EXCON/RCCNZ -3 people
- CCP – 5 people
- CDC – 2 people

Q2. Which agency did you represent at the exercise?

- Auckland EM – 3 people
- Police – 11 people
- RCCNZ – 1 person
- St John – 4 people

Q3. Do you have any comments on the goals and/or objectives of the exercise?

- Several comments that the goals and objectives were good, clear and/or concise
- Confused exercise - what are the goals in a disaster - to save lives - did not seem to be the objective on the day
- The expectation to process the number of people in a certain time was a little high considering the limited numbers we had available.
- I'm not sure the objectives of the exercise were met because the police treated it like a Cat I despite being a Cat II SAROP.
- The objectives of the exercise were good, however I don't think they were fully thought through in relation to CDC's
- It was well organised and slow paced on the Intel side, which was good but probably not what it would be like in a real life scenario

Q4. Was your venue suitable for your part of the exercise?

- 18 Yes
- 1 – room for RCCNZ was a bit tight

Q5. Are there any other agencies that you feel should have been included in your part of the exercise? If yes, which agencies?

- CD EOC should have been manned by relevant agencies
- 1 or 2 social agencies would have been good as an emergency event would require social service support and it would have been to see how the dynamics and the assistance those agencies would have provided e.g. MBIE, MSD etc
- Border agencies, Immigration in particular. Customs did say they would do things on behalf but if it were the real thing I don't see Immigration sitting on their hands
- MFAT, not sure if they were there?
- RED CROSS
- FENZ for manpower and additional resource

Q6. Do you have any suggestions on how we can improve the conduct of the exercise?

- Clearer brief to participants as to exercise delivery. Some confusion in regards to injects and excon communication lines.
- More realistic positive and negative injects from exercise control. The exercise flowed too smoothly and in a real life scenario there would be more issues thrown which would not be imagined or

considered so being thrown more issues throughout the exercise for specific agency or desk functions would have been good to really test out capabilities

- Set certain expectations a little lower.
- JRCCNZ did not know what was happening on scene as assets were tasked by EXCON which created a problem when the EOC requested a Sitrep.
- Clarity at the beginning around CAT1 and CAT2 incidents
- At times it seemed like Exercise Control was unaware of all that was happening within each of the teams.
- include different sources of information, not just what's in RIOD, possibly information from officers providing it in person or news release. Would have been good to have seen the media releases too

Q7. Did the exercise practice, teach or reinforce your understanding of responding to a mass rescue operation?

- Yes, a lot – 13 people
- Some – 5 people
- Not at all – 1 person

Q8. Please give an overall assessment of the exercise (on a scale of 1 to 5)

1. Very poor / waste of time - 0 people
2. Poor / significant problems with the exercise – 1 person
3. Fair / on right track but needs changes to improve – 5 people
4. Good / minor changes required – 10 people
5. Excellent / very valuable – 3 people

Q9. Do you have any other comments about the exercise?

- I really took a lot away from that session. The leadership demonstrated was world class and very inspirational. I have a much better understanding of such operations now.
- I think the exercise would be useful for sergeants only to attend given they are more likely to run such an operation rather than a large number of inspectors
- Great and well put exercise, more agencies would have been great but hopefully the next phase of the exercise would bring this in so to test that cross-agency work and relationship
- I suggest JRCCNZ be given a list of available assets and allow them to task the appropriate ones. JRCCNZ is then to inform EXCON what assets have been tasked. The alternative is to have JRCCNZ in the same room as EXCON so they can see the exercise board.
- It was a very worthwhile exercise to be part of
- There were many unrealistic parts to the exercise in relation to the CDC component. At one point we received "400" people at one time, which in reality would not occur as there was only 1 ferry with a capacity of 200 people running (to my understanding). This was because Exercise Control had jumped ahead of the "on the ground" team about how many people they had treated and sent to the mainland. At the time that we had 600 people, they thought they had only sent one ferry boat. Exercise Control jumped in to push the exercise along that did not match with what was really happening, and this could really be improved upon for a future exercise.
- THE POLICE DELAYED PEOPLE GETTING HELP BY HAVING TO PHOTOGRAPH THEM BEFORE THEY WERE SENT TO HOSPITAL. WOULD HAVE BEEN BETTER TO SEND PEOPLE DIRECTLY TO AUCKLAND INSTEAD OF TO WAIHEKE FIRST
- keep an open mind about what each agency can offer.
- It would be good to have the groups in different rooms but at the same location as this would allow people to visit those rooms and get a better idea of what each team is doing and how.
- For St John the assumption we had a large number of staff on Waiheke is quite unrealistic and dramatically changed our response
- The police information capture/reconciliation process needs to be reviewed as it slowed people getting through to the welfare support they needed.
- A good opportunity to get multiple agencies together, and learn about capabilities.

## 4 CONCLUSION

---

The general structure of the exercise day is working well. Changing the start of the exercise, where the decision was already made that it was a Mass Rescue, and it would be a Category II SAR, helped the initial flow of the exercise.

Participants are engaged and interested in understanding their roles and how they fit in with others.

Participants are generally finding the exercise day worthwhile.

CIMS 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition is critical to response should be incorporated in the MRO plan, and people using it.

## 5 SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

Serial	Area	Recommendation	Responsibility
(AUCKLAND 2017) - 1	Objective 1	For ease of understanding of terminology, CIMS titles should be used in an operation. (i.e.: deployment manager could be put under the Logistics title).	Auckland District Police
(AUCKLAND 2017) - 2	Objective 1	With the potential future one DCC in Tamaki Makaurau consideration needs to be given to both having sufficient capacity in the room and staffing to be able to run a much larger DCC <u>and</u> a major event simultaneously. If not already considered the new alternative National Crisis Management Centre in Auckland may be a suitable location	Auckland District Police
(AUCKLAND 2017) - 3	Objective 1	A written IAP is required to ensure that there is no confusion on what needs to be completed going forward into the next few hours, days, and weeks.	Auckland District Police
(AUCKLAND 2017) - 4	Objective 1	An IAP template, and a system to record and track the tasks from it, should be included in the MRO plan.	Auckland District Police
(AUCKLAND 2017) – 5	Objective 1	Planning was linked with Logistics in the exercise but sits as a separate role in the MRO plan. Planning should be a separate role	Auckland District Police
(AUCKLAND 2017) – 6	Objective 1	The EOC RCCNZ liaison position should be reflected in the MRO plan	Auckland District Police
(AUCKLAND 2017) – 7	Objective 1	A risk mitigation plan should be put into place. A system should be put into place to formally record, mitigate and action risks.	Auckland District Police
(AUCKLAND 2017) – 8	Objective 1	Using the screens in the EOC to display information would be helpful for people walking into the EOC.	Auckland District Police
(AUCKLAND 2017) – 9	Objective 5	A distribution list for circulating information from the EOC should be created.	Auckland District Police

Serial	Area	Recommendation	Responsibility
(AUCKLAND 2017) – 10	Other – CIMS 2 <sup>nd</sup> edition	Jerkins worn in the EOC need to be updated to reflect CIMS 2 <sup>nd</sup> edition. The role should also be displayed on the front (not just the back) and a clear plastic slot in the front to allow a name tag to be inserted would be useful so that you have a name for the person you are speaking to.	Auckland District Police
(AUCKLAND 2017) –11	Reconciliation	Reconciliation should occur at a CDC, not at the CCP. However, the innovative information gathering technique presented in the plan was tested and worked well. Consider testing it in a full deployment exercise, at the CDC.	Auckland District Police
(AUCKLAND 2017) – 12	Other – Radio Comms	The ability to monitor marine, fire and ambulance channels from the EOC could help with situational awareness	Auckland District Police
(AUCKLAND 2017 – 13)	Exercise Conduct	Update template for Communications plan	Exercise planning team
(AUCKLAND 2017 – 14)	Exercise Conduct	Develop photos and/or video to enhance exercise experience	Exercise planning team


## 6 APPENDIX 1: EXERCISE OBJECTIVES AND KPIS

The exercise series objectives and KPIs are based on those developed for the interagency National Exercise Programme (NEP).

NEP Objective	Exercise Objectives	Training Objectives	Key Performance Indicators
<i>NO #1</i>	<b>1.0 Lead a coordinated interagency response to a mass rescue incident</b>	1.1 Identify threat of a mass rescue incident	1.1.1 Coordinating authorities identify incident as a mass rescue event and activate the 'Mass Rescue Operations Response Plan' 1.1.2 Coordinating authorities determine if the incident is a Category 1 or Category 2 SAR 1.1.3 The National Security System is activated (notionally)
		1.2 Recognise what coordination centres would require to be activated to respond to a mass rescue incident	1.2.1 The lead agency activates a coordination centre at the EOC level to take operational level lead of the mass rescue response 1.2.2 RCCNZ escalates to an MRO response as per SOPs 1.2.3 Casualty Clearing Point(s) (landing zones) are identified 1.2.4 Civil Defence Centre(s) is notionally established for welfare arrangements 1.2.5 Other coordination centres as required (e.g. DVI, Health) are identified by the EOC (and will be role played by EXCON once notionally activated)
		1.3 Develop an effective action plan	1.3.1 An operational level Incident Action Plan is developed by the EOC 1.3.2 Planning processes are followed by the lead agency as established in SOPs and the 'Mass Rescue Operations Response Plan' 1.3.3 Other coordinating centres develop Incident Action Plans as appropriate (RCCNZ, Welfare) 1.3.4 Threats and associated risks are embedded in the action plans
		1.4 Coordinate the response to a mass rescue incident in accordance with the MRO Response Plan and CIMS	1.4.1 The response is managed in accordance with the 'Mass Rescue Operations Response Plan' 1.4.2 Liaison arrangements are maintained as required and in accordance with the 'Mass Rescue Operations Response Plan' 1.4.3 The systems, processes, and resources are appropriate for implementing the action plan 1.4.4 Situational awareness is gained and maintained 1.4.5 Lead agency delegates tasks to support agencies in accordance with established plans (some support agencies will be role played by EXCON) 1.4.6 Agencies carry out delegated tasks in accordance with SOPs

NEP Objective	Exercise Objectives	Training Objectives	Key Performance Indicators
<b>NO #5</b>	<b>5.0 Effectively manage information horizontally and vertically</b>	5.1 Incident information is effectively managed and communicated by all agencies involved	5.1.1 A communications plan is developed and implemented 5.1.2 Provision of timely, accurate, and clear information to those who need it 5.1.3 Accurate information is communicated within and across agencies in a timely manner using established ICT arrangements
		5.2 Support requirements are effectively communicated	5.2.1 Requests for support are effectively managed
<b>NO #6</b>	<b>6.0 Deliver effective public information management</b>	6.1 Public communications reinforce confidence in the response and provide appropriate levels of public assurance	6.1.1 Public information / messaging is coordinated and consistent across agencies 6.1.2 Messages align with and support the operational response
<b>NO #9</b>	<b>9.0 Further develop collaborative relationships, to enhance interagency knowledge and understanding; creating capability and resilience</b>	9.1 Agencies share information to engender an all hazards approach to incident management	9.1.1 Insights from the MRO exercise are shared with all relevant agencies

## 7 APPENDIX 2: EXERCISE ARRANGEMENTS



This diagram illustrates the arrangements for the exercise. The only exercise participants who have a view of the dynamic simulation are the members of the OSC.