

Exercise Evaluation Report

Operation Chelsea (MRO)

Auckland SAREX 2024

Location: *Auckland Harbour; Vicinity of Chelsea & Herne Bay; Queens Wharf; & Marine Rescue Center.*

Date: *Thursday 12th September 2024*

Report version: *Draft*

Evaluator(s): *Martin Paget*

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Executive Summary

If an incident involving maritime passenger transport operations occurs, the response may quickly become very complicated and challenging, mainly due to the potential scale of response required. Mass Rescue Operations have occurred in the past, and inevitably will be required again in the future.

In the Auckland region, in addition to other commercial and recreational marine traffic, more than 6 million commercial ferry passengers are carried per annum (over 164,00 per day average). Existing ferry capacity ranges from 20 pax to greater than 500. Auckland ferry operators rely principally on boarding passenger count only. There is often no immediately available passenger name manifest which could complicate the reconciliation and response processes. It is noted that after approximately 24 hours some additional information may become available as a result of the increasing use of the transport electronic account system.

Rescue and reconciliation processes are acknowledged as time critical and presenting challenges not routinely encountered.

Therefore, it is necessary for Mass Rescue Operation (MRO) response capability and processes to be well planned and regularly tested.

Multi agency responses are an important aspect of SAR responses in New Zealand. To ensure optimum outcomes of the collective effort, efficient and effective coordination both within agencies and across the system is essential.

Large scale multi-agency responses with multi-mode resources, including water, aviation and land based assets is challenging. Plans that ensure each agency's systems, processes and responses are complimentary are essential.

Initial responses to incidents are as often as not, perceived and frequently are, to a casual observer, chaotic.

Early response stage chaos is inevitable as there is very likely to be initial response resource constraints, and a lack of verified facts about the incident.

The only viable mitigation for these challenges is as much preparation as possible.

Good readiness plans and regular system practice or testing will contribute to an IMTs ability to convert chaos into order in the shortest possible time.

Preparation includes but is not limited to:

- Comprehensive readiness plans. [Creating readiness plans » NZSAR](#)
- Dedicated ICP resources
- Personnel who are trained and available within appropriate time frames.

This exercise intent was to test that response preparation. The SAREX response was generally well executed and clearly demonstrated the capability, nimbleness and expertise of participants.

To assist the reader of this report reference material links have been embedded with a view to assisting with context and reference to best practice.

Recommendations

Readiness Plans: [Creating readiness plans » NZSAR](#)

Review individual agency and stakeholder response plans to ensure they are practically and functionally integrated, are complementary and support multi agency best practice.

Operational Communications:

Specifically, document, (preferably graphically) a sector wide communications plan that identifies geographical coverage of each communication system, and details primary and secondary communications, especially for operational radio, that enables immediate understanding of communication radio channel identifiers as used by different agencies.

Coordination:

Ensure each core stakeholder and supporting agency plan details, practical coordination. command and control of response assets, as deployed in the field of operations. Ensure plans include Incident Control to OSC (On Scene Coordinator) briefing requirements. Including detail on delegating command and control authority, extent of delegated area of operations and assigned resources for coordination. Ensure MRO plan details communications processes and coordination between OSC and “casualty” crew, during evacuation from casualty craft.

Facilities:

Review the system’s ability to “standup” in a timely manner, functional spaces and resources required to support MRO IMT capability. It is suggested that police consider pre-establishing an ICP capability in the PMU main office space. This could include pre-installed planning whiteboards, immediately available reference material, communication devices and standing orders that enable large-scale multi-agency responses to have sufficient room within a controlled area.

ICP Human resource:

Consider options for alerting and mobilising additional support personnel for the ICP. Initially any person capable of being immediately available but competent with radio communications and log keeping could assist until additional specialist SAR personnel arrive and are utilized within the ICP. Log scribes, communication operators, IT specialists, Police intel, investigation liaison, other agency and transport operator liaison, Air liaison are just a few of the resources that will be required but will take time to deploy to an ICP.

[Activating SAR resources » NZSAR](#)

[Mobilising SAR resources » NZSAR](#)

Logs:

Address the inability to commence and maintain a single chronological operational response log without undue distraction of key IMT members.

Introduction

This exercise titled “Operation Chelsea” was conducted on the 12th of September 2024 between approximately 08:00 and 14:00.

SAREX Aim:

To test a multi-agency response to a category 1 mass rescue in the Hauraki Gulf

SAREX rationale:

The exercise scenario was conceived to consider a range of response risks and challenges that may occur. Overarching risks included:

- A scale of incident that necessitates mass rescue.
- Electric propelled ferries “currently being constructed for Auckland Harbour” have a risk albeit slight of battery thermal runaway and subsequent toxic fume emission that risks human life.
- MRO reconciliation logistics.
- Aviation response coordination challenges.

This exercise tests processes and capability that is continuously enhanced through lessons learnt from earlier operational debriefs. Additionally, a new reconciliation capability required operational testing.

Auckland region class 1 marine search and rescue operations are usually coordinated by the Auckland Police Maritime Unit, (supported by other police units: ASU, Intel, CIB and ICT) and often with the assistance of supporting agencies.

Supporting agencies include Auckland Coastguard, Surf Lifesaving NZ, St Johns Ambulance, Auckland Rescue Helicopter, Auckland Harbourmaster, Maritime Operations Centre, FENZ, NZDF, Harbour Master and others.

Key stakeholders include passenger ferry operators such as Fullers Ferries Ltd.

In this SAREX the intent to evaluate capability included:

- The coordination and derisking deployment of multiple helicopters by multiple agencies. These included, police, Defence and NRH (Westpac Rescue).
- Rescue response to an incident that presents environmental risk (vessel fire & marine environment).
- The coordination of water rescue and recovery capability.
- The reconciliation processes of rescued and recovered (deceased) role players.
- The overarching coordination and maintenance of situational awareness by the IMT.

To assist the reader of this report reference material links have been embedded with a view to assisting with context and reference to best practice.

Background

Mass Rescue Operations (MRO) as noted are challenging primarily due to scale.

MRO readiness plans (Responses) are in place locally and nationally.

In accordance with recognized best practice, police coordinated significant SAR operations are formally debriefed to identify if any lessons can be learnt.

Specific previously identified lessons learned include:

1. Use accurate language when receiving and relaying information (Op MIST)
2. Maintain chain of custody of critical items (Op MIST)
3. Breakdown of communication between informant and police (Op MIST)
4. Difficult radio communications on police vessels (Op MIST)
5. Poor relay of information to search assets (Op Triple 888)
6. Detailed Search taskings for assets (Op Triple 888)
7. Single person coordinating air assets (Op Triple 888 & Op Rowland)
8. Clear indication of who is in command – wear CIMS vests (Op Triple 888)
9. Confusion of tasking to Westpac via Airdesk (Op Rowland)
10. Search situational awareness – getting search patterns to assets (Op Biriauea)
11. Challenging communications (Op Biriauea)
12. Real time monitoring of search assets (Op Biriauea)

SAREX Objectives & Key Performance indicators:

1. Test how the IMT implements the Mass Rescue Plan (MRO).
 - a. *IMT accesses the Mass Rescue Plan in an appropriate time frame.*
 - b. *IMT procedures are in accordance with the Mass Rescue Plan.*
2. Information is effectively managed and communicated during the response.
 - a. *Information is collated and disseminated within the IMT as appropriate.*
 - b. *Communication lines between IMT and field teams operate effectively.*
3. All air assets are well controlled, informed, and aware of other assets in their airspace.
4. The rescue bridge is successfully deployed from a helicopter to persons in the water.
5. IMT operates within the CIMS model and principles.
 - a. *IMT structure is in accordance with CIMS.*
 - b. *All agencies operate within the CIMS model and principles.*
6. Effective reconciliation of all persons involved.
 - a. *Effective system in place to account for and track persons recovered.*
 - b. *All missing persons are accounted for.*
7. Safely and effectively demobilise assets.
 - a. *Know where search assets are and their status at all times.*
 - b. *All search assets are monitored until safely back to shore.*
8. Test the Communication Plan
 - a. *All assets are monitoring the correct channels.*
 - b. *Communication lines between IMT and field teams operate effectively.*

Coordinating Authority:
New Zealand Police.

SAREX Planning Team:
Sergeant Peter Comer
Senior Constable Stephen Hunt

Participating Agencies:
New Zealand Police, Auckland Coastguard, Surf Lifesaving New Zealand, Fullers Ferries, St Johns Ambulance, Auckland Rescue Helicopter, 6 Squadron RNZAF, Fire and Emergency New Zealand, Harbour Master.
The Maritime Operations Centre advised.
The Rescue Coordination Centre NZ advised.
Harbour master advised (NTMs issued).

Media:
The Police Media team led.
Customs Vessel HAWK used as scene media platform.

Scenario:
At approximately 0800 – 0830 hours a Fullers ferry will depart from the Ferry Basin, Auckland with passengers on board heading to Hobsonville.
As the Ferry is approaching Kauri Point a fire will instantly break out in the engine room. The fire will be sufficient to cause multiple passengers to leap from the ferry, some with burns/injuries.
Some passengers will remain on the ferry, again some with injuries.
The Ferry crew will commence their fire drills which include transmitting a distress call on VHF 16 (*Channel 77 as substitute for exercise*) to the Maritime Operations Centre. This information will be immediately relayed to the Police Communication Centre, and an Incident Management Team (IMT) will be stood up.
Due to the confined location, the ferry will deploy their anchor so not to drift. Once safely anchored, they will shut down their engines. An industrial smoke machine along with orange smoke flares will be activated.
The crew on the Ferry will fight the fire but control of the fire is not immediately contained. They will then prepare to abandon ship, launch their life raft and move persons outside onto the decks.

To assist the reader of this report reference material links have been embedded with a view to assisting with context and reference to best practice.

Predetermined Exercise Response

FENZ and SERT Paramedics will deploy from the Marine Rescue Centre.

A causality clearance point will be set up at Captain Cook Wharf by local Police staff. St John and FENZ will also respond to this location and establish their forward command for further assets to deploy from. This will be formally known as the Beach Head.

The first asset to arrive on scene should be the Police Eagle Helicopter, they will deploy a life raft from the helicopter. Westpac should also be tasked and arrive on scene. Westpac will put a paramedic into the water and winch one onto the ferry who will start triaging patients. Westpac will winch patients from the life raft.

6 Squadron will be returning from a sortie to Whenuapai and will hear the Mayday Transmission from the Ferry. They will immediately respond and are winch capable and announce their availability to the IMT on the VHF radio. Eagle will assume on-scene coordination of the air assets while Westpac winches from the life raft, and 6 Sqn winch from the water. (6 Squadron can only winch NZDF personnel)

The helicopters can transport their winched participants to the causality clearance point at Captain Cook Wharf. This landing zone will be established by FENZ and controlled by FENZ

When FENZ arrives on scene, they will fight the fire via suppression, getting the fire under control enough to allow rescue vessels to come along side and recover patients. There will be concern about the toxic fumes so all passengers will need to be evacuated from the vessel (Evacuate onto life raft).

FENZ and SERT (dependent on taskings requested by the IMT) will start triaging patients on board and will hand over patients to St John either on the vessel, or transport and hand over to St John at the causality clearance point at Captain Cook Wharf.

Coast Guard crews will triage those persons in the water and hand them over the St John with a full injury handover.

Once participants have been triaged and processed at Captain Cook Wharf, they will be deemed to be out of the exercise. The removal of their life jackets will signify they have been processed (once on land).

Search Assets will recover all persons from the water and the search will focus on the remaining missing persons.

There will be at least two people unaccounted for so the search will continue until Exercise Control calls for the demobilization.

On demobilization, all participants will be formally stood down before being released.

Evaluation Methodology

Objectives and associated KPIs were determined by Police and other participants in consultation with NZSAR evaluator.

Each KPI can be:

Met

Partially Met

Not Met

Evaluator comments are included where appropriate.

Evaluation method:

- Observation of IMT activity only, Relevant questioning of participants as appropriate.

Evaluation exclusion:

- On-scene activities not directly observed.
- Activities prior and post SAREX.

The evaluator remained present in the ICP throughout the entire exercise. The evaluator circulated the ICP making observational notes and taking photographs to document evidence. Some comments included relate to activities not observed and arise through casual interview where debrief and participant comments were consistent.

Report Process:

A draft copy of this report is submitted to the Police for review and feedback as appropriate.

After receipt of feedback a final report is completed, noted as "Final" and forwarded to Police.

This report dated 3rd October 2024 is the final report.

Findings

1. Test how the IMT implements the Mass Rescue Plan (MRO).

PARTIALLY MET

a) IMT accesses the Mass Rescue Plan in an appropriate time frame.

Comment:

The MRO plan was immediately available and observed to be accessed by Incident Controller (IC) in the first few minutes of the response.

b) IMT procedures are in accordance with the Mass Rescue Plan.

Comment:

After initial “awareness” occurred through notification via a phone call, an immediate decision regarding the unsuitability of the police base as the ICP facility was made. The IMT then relocated to a larger space on the first floor of the same building. The stated intention was to establish the ICP in the room adjacent to the coastguard operations room. As this was not immediately available the ICP was established in an alternative room on the same floor. This room was not adequately pre equipped for ICP functions. This ICP facility deficit hampered the IMT ability to function efficiently throughout the response.

The MRO plan as written, was generally followed, but not observed to be frequently referenced. The IC and other IMT SAR specialists were negatively impacted by resource and facility limitations. The IC and other IMT members demonstrated their core expertise when initiating the response and initiating IMT processes including commencing and maintaining logs, seeking amplifying information, generating written IAP, etc.

2. Information is effectively managed and communicated during the response.

PARTIALLY MET

a) Information is collated and disseminated within the IMT as appropriate.

Comment:

During the first minutes of the response effort was appropriately focused generating initial actions including the establishment of IMT functional positions. In the early stages of the response internal IMT information was shared verbally.

Initial action tasking via radio and telephone to other agencies was verbal, brief and generic. In due course whiteboards were utilized to capture information and status of resources.

Very good regular briefing schedule for the IMT was established, thereby ensuring the IMT became and mostly remained situationally aware.

Radio communication challenges (principally due to poor area coverage with the “SAREX” selected operational channel 77) and a critical personal shortage in the ICP severely hampered the efficiency of the IMT.

Also compromised was the ability to establish and maintain detailed records.

Regardless, a range of recording processes were in due course enabled using whiteboards, notebooks, notepaper and electronic systems.

No ideal single point (cross agency) chronological or decision log was observed to be commenced until well into the response. Access to a coastguard log system (DH4) was sought but hampered by access restrictions and mostly discounted. Coastguard liaison did, however, from time to time provide in person reports to the IMT regarding coastguard resource activity.

Individual IMT functional managers and participating agencies established their own logs using a variety of methods and systems.

b) Communication lines between IMT and field teams operate effectively.

Comment:

ICP communications were challenged by a range of issues.

Challenges included suboptimal access to robust marine communications in the ICP. The ICP use of portables (low power) and the scenario location and marine VHF channel 77 coverage hampered radio communications.

The IMT was further impacted by excess workload on individuals caused by the lack of sufficient additional personnel that would enable the appointment of dedicated radio operators and scribes. Direct communications between the ICP and ALL deployed-on water resources was ad hoc and not ideally established.

Partially to address this direct communication issue, an OSC was appropriately appointed (police on Deodar III).

I note it was reported however that there was a general lack of understanding by all on water resources about communication lines, command and coordination authority and detailed processes for communications during victim extraction from the stricken ferry.

There was the opaqueness around the OSCs ability to directly task and subsequently coordinate on scene assets

3. All air assets are well controlled, informed, and aware of other assets in their airspace.

MET

Comment:

Three (3) aviation assets deployed to the scene. An air directing/liaison officer was appointed at the ICP.

Communications were established with each aviation asset, although it's noted that the three agency aviation assets were challenged by the necessity to monitor multiple radio frequencies. To assist with airspace deconfliction communications was also established between each helicopter. Appropriate and robust processes were reported to be in place to ensure safety separation distances was always maintained. Tasking and situation reports were communicated to and within the ICP.

NOTE: Initial tasking of the NRHL asset (Westpac Helicopter) was activated through the national "Air Desk". This was initially denied (SAREX issue only) and is a matter that St Johns will address.

[See comment on communications](#)

Each aviation asset had their own objectives which they hoped to achieve. These may not have been necessarily consistent with how they would have operated if the incident had been real world.

4. The rescue bridge (Life raft alternative) is successfully deployed from a helicopter to persons in the water.

MET

Comment:

The life raft is reported as having been successfully deployed from the Police Helicopter

5. IMT operates within the CIMS model and principles.

MET

a) IMT structure is in accordance with CIMS.

Comment:

On initial notification to the Police base, a police member assumed Incident Control. After assessing the incident with an initial “size up” or “appreciation” he determined that the situation required an MRO response. He then relocated from the police base to a larger space on the 1st floor of the same building and established the ICP. On arrival, functional managers were appointed to appropriate roles. Identifying jerkins were distributed and worn. Function crossover occurred in this early response stage as expected to assist with management of the inevitable excessive and uneven function workload as the response gathered way. Objective 2 KPI 2(a) comment is also relevant to this objective. Response appropriate processes were commenced and in due course a written IAP developed.

b) All agencies operate within the CIMS model and principles.

Comment:

The IMT was initially comprised of only police members. Liaisons from coastguard, Surf Lifesaving, St Johns and FENZ were present in the ICP from time to time. The IMT would have benefited from a better facility set up that better enabled and more importantly encouraged a persistent presence from supporting agencies. Supporting agencies followed CIMS principles.

Strengthening of the common understanding of characteristics such as “Consolidated planning; Integrated information management and communications; and Coordination of resources” would enhance future responses.

6. Effective reconciliation of all persons involved.

MET

a) Effective system in place to account for and track persons recovered.

Comment:

A new Police system (Survey123) for recording and managing reconciliation data was activated and tested during this SAREX. The system performed extremely well. I was advised that the initial physical layout was refined during the response. This activity on Queens Wharf was planned and designated as the “Beach Head or Landing Point”. This was the location where Triage and reconciliation processes were undertaken.

Consideration for future responses should be given to the appointment of an OSC at the “beach head” or the establishment of a separate IMT.

In a real-world response, it is likely an RCC would be established by police, thereby relieving the SAR IMT of this workload.

b) All missing persons are accounted for.

Comment:

During the SAREX refinement of triage and reconciliation processing setup was undertaken to mitigate the risk of rescued persons inadvertently slipping through the controls in place. The experience highlights the importance of implementing in the first instance a “funnel” system for processing of all rescued and recovered persons. Comment in the previous KPI (6.a) refers. Eventually the IC was confident that all persons had been accounted for and was able to declare the rescue and recovery effort had been completed.

7. Safely and effectively demobilize assets.

MET

a) Know where search assets are and their status at all times.

Comment:

The IMT had sufficient communications either directly or indirectly through agency liaison regarding the location and status of deployed assets. There was some initial disconnect in the response when it became clear that the OSC did not enjoy the same level visibility of status specifically for all surf and coastguard resources. This was resolved in due course.

b) All search assets are monitored until safely back to shore.

Comment:

The IMT in conjunction with resource agency owners-maintained communications to ensure that all deployed resources were stood down appropriately.

8. Test the Communication Plan

PARTIALLY MET

a) All assets are monitoring the correct channels.

Comment:

The communication plan was tested. However, the plan was demonstrated to be lacking sufficient detail to meet operational needs. The plan requires coverage maps, and identification of communication frequencies as well as channel identifiers.

The previous point is especially important as misunderstandings can occur as different agencies have different names or identifiers for the same radio frequencies.

b) Communication lines between IMT and field teams operate effectively.

Comment:

Communications were established in line with the plan.

Communications were not efficient or conducive for efficient operational requirements. Issues encountered included, the planned radio channel area coverage and lack tasking communication detail specifically relating to rescue coordination between ferry and rescue vessels.

Detailed coordination processes for all response assets (including on water, aviation, vessels of opportunity, etc.) including communications identifying how each approach or tasking for rescuing SAR subjects from a casualty vessel and or scene is required.

Conclusions

This MRO SAREX was ambitious with each organisation hoping to achieve a range of objectives for their own needs.

The overarching intent of the SAREX was to test the system's ability to respond to and manage a large-scale MRO that would require a rescue and or recovery from a ferry.

Each organisation had pre-determined outcomes they sought, and these mostly, were not subject to this evaluation.

From observation and subsequent debriefs, it is clear that each organisation has good capability and understand the challenges and risks associated in a mass rescue operation.

As MRO responses are infrequent, there is often a tendency to succumb to "normal bias" and utilize systems and processes that a low scale and frequently experienced responses require.

As observed by this evaluator I would propose that each element identified in this report after changes are designed and implemented, be re exercised.

It would be beneficial in the first instance, to initially desktop each element, eventually culminating in a whole system desktop.

MRO elements that should be reviewed and re-exercised at least include:

- Communications plan
- MRO SAR ICP facilities & setup
- ICP human resource enhancement
- OSC authority and responsibility and scene coordination
- Reconciliation establishment


Appendix 1

Exercise photos


Location of SAREX Graphic



ICP Established on 1st Floor MRC graphic



Whiteboard IAP graphic



Asset/Resource Tracking Whiteboard graphic

Field Team Deployment

Team #	Team Members	D/T Deployed	Current Task	GR & Time (no more than 2 hours old)	Debrief Y/N
DIII	3+ PM	D	Water command	4 IIR on scene waiting Purple safe	
Police 2	3+ PM	D	Taken Police Bridge Casualty point	2 JEL SKI on scene making people safe	
AMOS barge	- ROSE - CEST	Enroute 1030	Transport fire / ambulances - Not to refuel		
CGNZ heavy TRK		1020 EPT	Chelsea Sugar works Head east to stop People drinking whiskey - Sweeping	NO INJURY - 10-2 back to Captain Cook	
CGNZ small NS		1020 EPT	Casualty transport		
Small Hovak		1035 on scene	Casualty transport		

Tasking graphic

Asset	Obs on	Observation	Notes
Eagle			
Seasprite		Can assist to wheel	
Lion	To MCC	Transport from purveyors to Captain Cook on bridge to coordinate Natchemans	
IRB 1			
IRB 2			
IRB 3			
IRB 4			
Sutski 1			
Sutski 2			
Marine One	Over	From casualty transport to Captain Cook	6 - 1 Deceased -
HBC		Still searching west of location	
Warper			


ON SCENE CONTROLLER

- * Marine Decatur III
- * LAMP L&AR - Recan
- * ST JOHN - TRIAGE


TO DO

- * CSAR - Recan
- * CIS - enquiries
- * Contact Fullers
- * Medivac?

Coastguard Log: Remote view Graphic



ARCGIS Survey123 Reconciliation system graphic



Appendix 2

SAREX Planning Document

MARINE SAREX – OPERATION CHELSEA

Thursday 12th of September 2024

Introduction:

Within the Auckland region all class 1 marine search and rescue operations are controlled by the Auckland Police Maritime Unit alongside our supporting agencies. These agencies include, but not limited to, Auckland Coastguard, Surf Lifesaving NZ, St Johns Ambulance, Auckland Rescue Helicopter, Auckland Harbourmaster, Maritime Operations Centre, FENZ, NZDF, Harbour Master and various others. Our maritime community also actively participate and assist where they can. This includes the Fullers Ferries, Ports of Auckland, and various commercial and recreational craft.

All major SAR operations are formally debriefed and any lessons that need to be learnt are identified. Some of these lessons are:

13. Use accurate language when receiving and relaying information (Op MIST)
14. Maintain chain of custody of critical items (Op MIST)
15. Breakdown of communication between informant and police (Op MIST)
16. Difficult radio communications on police vessels (Op MIST)
17. Poor relay of information to search assets (Op Triple 888)
18. Detailed Search taskings for assets (Op Triple 888)
19. Single person coordinating air assets (Op Triple 888 & Op Rowland)
20. Clear indication of who is in command – wear CIMS vests (Op Triple 888)
21. Confusion of tasking to Westpac via Airdesk (Op Rowland)
22. Search situational awareness – getting search patterns to assets (Op Biriauea)
23. Challenging communications (Op Biriauea)
24. Real time monitoring of search assets (Op Biriauea)

There are multiple ferries operating within the Waitemata Harbour and Hauraki Gulf transporting daily commuters and the public between various parts of Auckland and the Hauraki Gulf Islands. There have been a few incidents over the last few years involving these ferries. Incidents such as fires and a partial sinking all resulting in multiple persons being rescued. Auckland City also hosts up to 100 cruise ships each year and in April this year, a commercial fishing vessel ran aground on the Noises near Waiheke Island. A mass rescue event involving a commercial ferry is a very real risk in Auckland.

In April 2023 a mass rescue desktop exercise was run in Tamaki Makaurau involving the three Auckland Police Districts, this was operation Rauora II. This desktop exercise involved the various District Leadership Teams as the Response Managers and Incident Management Teams and the execution of the Auckland Mass Rescue Plan. What wasn't tested is the initial Incident Management Team recognising the incident as a Mass Rescue and activating the Mass Rescue Plan accordingly. Also, as it was a desktop exercise, the operational logistics of managing the reconciliation of a mass rescue were not tested.

During a recent training exercise, a rescue bridge was deployed from the helicopter, and it failed after being damaged during deployment.

To improve operational readiness, we regularly train with these other agencies. These training exercises identify any weaknesses in our operation for us to improve how we work together in a multi-agency SAR response controlled by an Incident Management Team within the CIMS structure.

Operation CHELSEA:

Operation CHELSEA is a Search and Rescue Exercise designed so the incident management team will recognise it as a mass rescue and implement the mass rescue plan. It will test the coordination of multiple assets from various agencies as well as the effective reconciliation of all exercise subjects.

It is not designed to test the actions of the Response Manager, but a Response Manager will be appointed to facilitate the exercise.

The SAR Response will be a category 1 SAR run by a Police IMT within the CIMS structure. The Response Manager will be a delegate of the Police District Commander.

SAREX Objectives:

2. The Incident Management Team (IMT) to identify the incident as a mass rescue and implement the Auckland Mass Rescue Plan, testing this plan.
3. Effective communication and control over a multi-agency response given the various communication platforms used by different agencies.
4. Effective initial tasking, information transfer and control over air assets.
5. Successful deployment of life raft from the helicopter.
6. Effective command structure and all personnel involved are aware of the command chain and who is in control.
7. To test the reconciliation of all persons involved.
8. Safely and effectively demobilise all search assets in the field.
9. Test the Communication Plan.

Key Performance indicators:

1. Test how the IMT implements the Mass Rescue Plan.
 - a. IMT accesses the Mass Rescue Plan in an appropriate time frame.
 - b. IMT procedures are in accordance with the Mass Rescue Plan.
2. Information is effectively managed and communicated during the response.
 - a. Information is collated and disseminated within the IMT as appropriate.
 - b. Communication lines between IMT and field teams operate effectively.
3. All air assets are well controlled, informed, and aware of other assets in their airspace.
4. The rescue bridge is successfully deployed from a helicopter to persons in the water.
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 - a. Know where search assets are and their status at all times.
 - b. All search assets are monitored until safely back to shore.
8. Test the Communication Plan
 - a. All assets are monitoring the correct channels.
 - b. Communication lines between IMT and field teams operate effectively.

Coordinating Authority:

New Zealand Police.

SAREX Planning Team:

The planning team for this SAREX consists of Sergeant Peter Comer and Senior Constable Stephen Hunt from the Auckland Police Maritime Unit with the assistance of:

Participating Agencies:

New Zealand Police, Auckland Coastguard, Surf Lifesaving New Zealand, Fullers Ferries, St Johns Ambulance, Auckland Rescue Helicopter, 6 Squadron RNZAF, Fire and Emergency New Zealand, Harbour Master.

The Maritime Operations Centre have been advised and consulted in relation to the mayday call that will be transmitted to commence the SAREX, and precautions will be taken to avoid the public becoming mistaken about the call.

The Rescue Coordination Centre NZ has also been advised of the SAREX and a NTM's completed.

Media:

This exercise will involve numerous agencies, all of whom will want to promote their involvement and training. The Police Media team have been advised of the exercise and will coordinate the media releases from the Police perspective. All media teams will work together on the day from the Customs Vessel HAWK. Snr Const Steve HUNT will oversee this team and vessel on the day along with Jarred Williamson from the NZP Media Team.

EXERCISE COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS:**Ground:**

The Incident management Team will be based at the Marine Rescue Centre, Mechanics Bay, Auckland.

The exercise area is inside the Waitemata Harbour bounded by the Auckland Harbour Bridge to the east and Kauri Point to the west with the shorelines of Auckland on the south and North Shore on the north.

Situation:

The Waitemata Harbour and Hauraki Gulf in Auckland is the operational area of many commuter ferries as well as charter vessels and Cruise Ships during the cruise season. With the number of these vessels in operation there is a very real risk of a mass rescue event occurring in the region. Tabletop exercises have been recently conducted, but the on water functional response has not been tested.

New electrically propelled ferries are currently being constructed for the Auckland Harbour. Given the experiences around the world of thermal runaway and the toxic fumes generated in electric car fires, it is prudent we train for an event involving a fire on board a ferry.

All major Marine Search and Rescue Operations in the region over the past two years have been formally debriefed and lessons identified that need to be learnt. These learnings have not been tested.

Mission:

To test a multi-agency response to a category 1 mass rescue in the Hauraki Gulf

Execution:

On Thursday the 12th of September 2024 a Marine Search and Rescue Exercise will be conducted within the Waitemata Harbour. This exercise will involve multiple agencies namely, NZ Police, Fullers Ferries, Auckland Coastguard, Surf Lifesaving NZ, Auckland Rescue Helicopter Trust, Fire and Emergency NZ, St Johns Ambulance NZ, 6 Squadron RNZAF and Harbour Master.

The exercise will be conducted in 4 phases.

Phase 1 – Exercise Planning

Phase 2 – Pre deployment preparation

Phase 3 – Execution of scenario including demobilisation.

Phase 4 – Exercise debriefs.

Detailed Tasks:

Phase 1.

The planning team will be led by Sergeant Comer and Senior Constable Hunt of the Auckland Maritime Police and will include members from that unit.

Two meetings will be facilitated at the Marine Rescue Centre, the first on the 22nd of July attended by the Police Maritime Unit leadership team, to confirm exercise objectives, key performance indicators and the finer logistics assigning staff to roles.

The second meeting will also be at the Marine Rescue Centre on the 23rd of July with all external agency representatives invited. The purpose of this meeting is to fine tune the timings and the scenario with the other agencies to ensure other agency objectives are catered for and the scenario can evolve without any major issues. At this meeting we will also confirm participant numbers (role player participants) to ensure we have sufficient to achieve all the objectives.

Once staff roles, participant numbers and scenario detail are confirmed, a safety plan will be written to ensure all participants are kept safe throughout the exercise.

The finer logistics of participant transportation and messing will also be confirmed.

Phase 2.

On the 12th of September, the crew of the safety vessels and all participants will be assembled, on board the Fullers Ferry at the Ferry basin. A full safety briefing will be provided.

All staff who will be part of the Incident Management Team will assemble at the Marine Rescue Centre until the exercise commences.

Once the safety officer is satisfied all persons are fully briefed, the scenario can begin commencing the exercise.

Phase 3.

Scenario commences. Initial notification will come via the Maritime Operations Centre and the IMT will be stood up. Once the IMT activates the Mass Rescue Plan a Response Manager will be appointed to facilitate the SAREX.

Once all exercise objectives are met the exercise controller will make the call to end the exercise. Once this call is made, the IMT is to commence the demobilisation of all resources. Once the demobilisation is complete, the IMT can stand down.

Phase 4.

At the conclusion of the exercise, a hot debrief will be conducted at the Marine Rescue Centre. A formal debrief will be convened on the receipt of the evaluators report again at the Marine Rescue Centre on Thursday 26th September.

Admin/Logistics.

Messing – a BBQ will be cooked at the Marine Rescue Centre after the hot debrief for all participants to attend. Person responsible TBA

Budget – Expenses incurred will be the exercise evaluator, BBQ and possibly transportation. All expenses will be paid by the Police and then re-imburement requested from NZSAR. All outside agencies have been asked if they are charging for their services, and none have advised there will be a charge.

Transportation – the 10-seater van has been booked from the Auckland City Police Hub. Once participant numbers are confirmed, the transport logistics will be re-assessed, and transportation arranged.

Briefing rooms – The Motuihe Room at the Marine Rescue Centre has been booked for the entire day. The Rererangi Room has been booked from 0600 – 1000 hrs.

IMT – The IMT will be based in the Operations Room at the Maritime Police base.

Exercise control will be based in the muster room at the Maritime Police Base.

Command/ Signals:

Exercise Control – Sergeant Peter Comer

Response Manager – TBA (Possibly Inspector Graham)

Safety Officer – Sergeant Jesse Jenden

Exercise Evaluator – Martin Paget

Communications between safety officers & safety vessels will be via VHF Radio Ch 8

Vessels involved in the SAREX will use VHF Ch 77 and Police Radio Ch City 2

Scenario:

How this scenario executes will be determined by the Incident Management Team (IMT). Exercise Control will provide impromptu injects to guide the response as required but it is expected to go something like this:

At approximately 0800 – 0830 hours a Fullers ferry will depart from the Ferry Basin, Auckland with passengers on board heading to Hobsonville.

As the Ferry is approaching Kauri Point a fire will instantly break out. Location of the fire will be in the engine room. The fire will be sufficient to cause multiple passengers to leap from the ferry, some with burns/injuries.

Some passengers will remain on the ferry, again some with injuries.

The Ferry crew will commence their fire drills which include transmitting a distress call on VHF Channel 77 to the Maritime Operations Centre. This information will be immediately relayed to the Police Communication Centre, and an Incident Management Team (IMT) will be stood up.

Due to the confined location, the ferry will deploy their anchor so not to drift. Once safely anchored, they will shut down their engines. An industrial smoke machine along with orange smoke flares will be activated.

FENZ and SERT Paramedics will deploy from the Marine Rescue Centre.

The crew on the Ferry will fight the fire but control of the fire is not immediately contained. They will then prepare to abandon ship, launching their life raft and moving persons outside onto the decks.

A causality clearance point will be set up at Captain Cook Wharf by local Police staff. St John and FENZ will also respond to this location and establish their forward command for further assets to deploy from. This will be formally known as the Beach Head.

The first asset to arrive on scene should be the Police Eagle Helicopter, they will deploy a life raft from the helicopter. Westpac should also be tasked and arrive on scene. Westpac will put a paramedic into the water and winch one onto the ferry who will start triaging patients. Westpac will winch patients from the life raft.

6 Squadron will be returning from a sortie to Whenuapai and will hear the Mayday Transmission from the Ferry. They will immediately respond and are winch capable and announce their availability to the IMT on the VHF radio. Eagle will assume on scene coordination of the air assets while Westpac winches from the life raft, and 6 Sqn winch from the water. (6 Squadron can only winch NZDF personnel)

The helicopters can transport their winched participants to the causality clearance point at Captain Cook Wharf. This landing zone will be established by FENZ and controlled by FENZ

When FENZ arrive on scene, they will fight the fire via suppression, getting the fire under control enough to allow rescue vessels to come along side and recover patients. There will be concern about the toxic fumes so all passengers will need to be evacuated from the vessel (Evacuate onto life raft).

FENZ and SERT(dependant on taskings requested by the IMT) will start triaging patients on board and will hand over patients to St John either on the vessel, or transport and hand over to St John at the causality clearance point at Captain Cook Wharf.

Coast Guard crews will tirage those persons in the water and hand them over the St John with a full injury handover.

Once participants have been triaged and processed at Captain Cook Wharf, they will be deemed to be out of the exercise. The removal of their life jackets will signify they have been processed (once on land).

Search Assets will recover all persons from the water and the search will focus on the remaining missing persons. There will be at least two persons unaccounted for so the search will continue until Exercise Control calls for the demobilisation.

On demobilisation, all participants will be formally stood down before being released.

Peter Comer

Steve Hunt

Sergeant

Snr Const

Auckland Police Maritime Unit

Auckland Police Maritime Unit

021 191 0047

021 191 4487

Appendix 3

Planning Safety Brief

Operation CHELSEA PMU SAREX MASS RESCUE Safety Brief

SAREX Location: Herne Bay, Upper Harbour



Activity Supervisor: Sgt P COMER 021 191 0047

S/Con Steve Hunt 021 191 4487

Safety Supervisor: Sgt J JENDEN 021 191 2131

- Briefing all safety staff, participants, and role players.
- Overall conduct of the activity
- Conducting safety procedure for persons in water
- Completing a Risk Analysis checklist before the activity.
- All participants aware of **“NO DUFF”** procedure for serious injury or safety breach.

Safety Officer/s: Sgt J JENDEN

- Safety during the conduct of the activity.
- Implementing procedures in the event of a breach of safety, accident, or emergency. **“NO DUFF”** real time injury call for SAREX to cease immediately.

Medic: First Aid/Trauma Kit/AED location: Police Rhib 3
Deodar 3

Safety Vessel: Police Rhib 3 - Dive Flag Master: Sgt Jesse JENDEN, Con Adam POWELL
Spare Rescue Bridge

Safety Vessel: PWC & Rescue Sled Master: Sgt Craig Kennedy

Safety Vessel: HM Vessel - Dive Flag Skipper + 1: TBC

Safety Vessel: HM Vessel- Cordon - Dive Flag Skipper + 1: TBC

Safety Officer Fullers Ferry Te Kotuku: – Vessel Master

FENZ (Onboard Te Kotuku) – Leon FORD – Safety Officer

Communication:

SAREX Operational Channels

Phone, Police Radio, Marine VHF 77 (Treated as CH16)

Communication while SAREX in progress between non-Police Rescue assets will be on VHF channel 77

Police assets via VHF 77 and Police Radio, Channel City 2 Secure

Police to Police Comms on City 2 Secure

Westpac Rescue Helicopter to call up on VHF 77.

Safety Vessels, PWC, Ferry Officer, Ship to Ship VHF 08 with a listening watch on VHF 77 for situational awareness.

Nearest Medical facility: North Shore Hospital, Auckland Hospital

Identified Risks

Drift

12 Sept 24

Low Tide is 0705 1.0

High water is 1340 2.7

Incoming Tide for the duration of the exercise

Tidal flow in the upper harbour near Kauri Point is at a rate of up to 2knts flow rate. It is expected that in the time the participants enter the water, there is the potential for them to drift up to 2nm depending on the time it takes for rescue assets to arrive. To mitigate this, participants will be instructed to enter the water at the last possible moment once the safety officer identified that rescue assets have been tasked and are deploying.

Cold Sea and Air Temperatures

In the event of early onset of Hypothermia, the swimmer will be removed from the water and transferred to Deodar 3 for warming up. Available onboard will be a warm shower, Hot drink and blankets if required.

Signs are:

- Shivering.
- Slurred speech or mumbling.
- Slow, shallow breathing.
- Clumsiness or lack of coordination.
- Drowsiness or very low energy.
- Confusion or memory loss.
- Loss of consciousness.

Drowning or loss of swimmer

The swimmers in the water will be constantly monitored by the three safety vessels. The swimmers will be highly visible by their orange lifejackets and regular head counts will be conducted.

Once placed in the water the group will be concentrated together so to be easily monitored. The formation of the safety vessels will encircle the group unless the scenario calls for the group to separate. The group may be split but will not be split to any greater than three groups so as each group can be monitored by its own safety vessel. Any separation will be decided upon by the **Safety Officer** at the time considering weather and sea conditions and other vessels/assets in the area.

In the case of a drowning, **“NO DUFF”** will be called immediately and recovery procedures will take place.

Propellor Strike

The skipper of each safety vessel will ensure that no person is near the propellers at any time while in the water. If any person is to be taken onboard a safety vessel, then the engine must be switched off while boarding is underway, or as a minimum the closest engine is to be switched if it has more than one. This is except for the PWC which has no external propellor and a rescue sled keeping distance from the water intake.

Other vessels in the area

Police Rhib 2 which will have the **Safety Officer** on board will be the primary Safety Vessel with the swim group whilst in the water. The **Safety Officer** will monitor and control the other safety vessels for the duration of the SAREX. Both Police Rhib 2 and the HM vessel will have a Dive Flag Alpha flying to notify any other vessels in the area that speed is restricted to 5knts within 200m of that location. The PWC will not display a Dive Flag but will be aware of the restriction. Any vessels in or near the area will be monitored for proximity to the group.

Sharks or other sea creatures.

In the rare event of an incident involving sea creatures, trauma kits suitable for dealing with lacerations and blood loss are available on the Safety Vessels. If required staff will undertake first aid and coordinate the necessary evacuation asset for transporting to hospital.

Swimmers (Role Players)

All swimmers (Role Players) who are entering the water must:

- Be briefed by the **Safety Officer**
- Be aware of their role in the exercise (If given), perceived injury, and condition as role players. They must stick to their role and script and not go off tangent with the role playing. This exercise is about learnings for the organisations and IMT and needs to be kept simple.
- Be wearing Thermal protection and Orange SOLAS Life vest appropriate for 30-60 mins in the water.
- Monitor each other by checking in and ensuring all are OK while in the water.

Every person who enters the water needs to be with a buddy. No person is to be alone in the water for safety.

- Be aware of the methods of indicating an incident or requirement for intervention by a Safety vessel or withdrawal from SAREX.
 - One or both arms above head, and if that does not alert the safety vessel, blowing 3 times on the lifejacket whistle.
 - In the event of above, the **Safety officer** will direct PWC and Rescue sled to the swimmer for abstraction onto a Safety Vessel where an immediate assessment will be made for any medical treatment required.
- All participants need to be aware that there will be smoke flares set off by the crew of the vessel, but these will be managed by the crew for safety.
- All participants who enter the water can have one gear bag with them. They will get changed into their wetsuits once on the ferry enroute to the SAREX location and their dry clothes placed into one closed bag. This bag will then be transferred to a safety vessel where it will be taken to the reconciliation point. Once processed swimmers will be able to change into dry clothing and are free to leave the SAREX when advised. Changing facilities will be available in the Police Mobile Command Campervan or FENZ tent if available.

Dry Passengers remaining on the ferry (Role Players)

All (Role Players) who are remaining on the vessel must:

- Be briefed by the **Safety Officer**
- Be aware of their role in the exercise, perceived injury, and condition as role players. They must stick to their role and script and not go off tangent with the role playing. This exercise is about learnings for the organisations and IMT and needs to be kept simple.
- Be aware to notify the vessel Master if there is a safety concern or need to be removed from the SAREX.
- All participants need to be aware that there will be smoke flares set off by the crew of the vessel, but these will be managed by the crew for safety.
- Ensure they have been fitted with a correct fitting lifejacket before getting off the vessel. (These need to be kept separate at the reconciliation point for return to the ferry on the completion of the SAREX.)

Passengers who will be placed on a shore location for searches to find (Role Players)

All (Role Players) who are remaining on the vessel must:

- Be briefed by the **Safety Officer**
- Be aware of their role in the exercise, perceived injury, and condition as role players. They must stick to their role and script and not go off tangent with the role playing. This exercise is about learnings for the organisations and IMT and needs to be kept simple.
- Be aware to contact the Safety Offer (Sgt J JENDEN) if they have a need to be withdrawn from the SAREX.
- At all times when transiting to and from the shore location be wearing a PFD lifejacket
- **Note:** Some participants will have a laminated tag stating their injury or condition for the SAREX. **ALL PARTICIPANTS WILL BE RECONCILED BY THE RECONCILIATION TEAM ON LAND AT CAPTAIN COOK WHARF TO ENSURE ALL PARTICIPANTS ARE ACCOUNTED FOR. DO NOT LEAVE THE RECONCILIATION POINT UNTIL YOU HAVE BEEN TRIAGED AND YOUR NAME HAS BEEN COLLECTED BY SOMEONE**

YOU WILL BE DEEMED TO BE NO LONGER IN THE SAREX ONCE YOU HAVE BEEN TRIAGED AT THE RECONCILIATION POINT ON CAPTAIN COOK WHARF AND YOUR LIFEJACKET HAS BEEN REMOVED.

Action in the Event of an Emergency: (“No Duff” call for real time injury)

- a) Any person can stop the activity if they see that a serious accident is about to occur or has occurred. The command to stop all activity will be **“NO DUFF”**. Or **“continuous blowing of the whistle if in water”**.
- b) All swimmers are to ensure their personal safety and wellbeing is ok and to group together for removal from the water.
- c) Once the emergency has been identified the **Safety Officer is to take charge of the incident.**
- d) The **Activity Supervisor is to take charge of the remaining swimmers** and participants not involved in the incident and detail all actions to be carried out.
- e) Administer first aid and contact the nearest medical emergency service.
- f) Evacuate the casualty to the nearest medical centre by the most appropriate means.
- g) Minor injuries – first aid kit available

Injury occurs onboard the Fullers Ferry

Initial assessment of the injury to be made by the crew of the Fullers Ferry and relayed immediately to the **Vessel Master** and then to the **Safety Officer**.

First aid to be administered where necessary by the Fullers Ferry crew under instruction from the Vessel Master.

If abstraction is required from the Ferry to a Safety vessel, one will come alongside for patient uplift.

Action to Evacuate injured person.

Under control of the **Activity Supervisor**, if time allows.

Patient can be taken to nearest point, Public beach access, Birkenhead Wharf, Rhib can beach to meet Ambulance, or

Assemble at designated assembly point - Deodar – head count.

If required a casualty can be transferred to Deodar 3 and can be winched from the aft deck by Rescue Helicopter.

Action in event of Safety vessel failure

Notify **Safety Officer**

If it is a safety risk and requires the SAREX to cease? call **“NO DUFF”**.

If it can be managed, communication to the other safety vessels to be aware and an alternative safety vessel to be bought in.

May need to reduce numbers in the water for monitoring.

Eagle

Eagle will deploy a 4-person Aviation approved Life Raft.

Eagle Helicopter crew will locate and identify persons in the water wearing Blue or white helmets and deploy the life raft to them specifically.

When deployed from the Helicopter the crew of Eagle will activate the raft by pulling the activation painter causing it to open. They will then make separation and continue with their tasking. Careful consideration by the Eagle crew to ensure a safe drop location and that there is a Safety vessel nearby to monitor both the drop and deployment.

In the event an Egress Swimmer from Eagle is placed into the water, he/she will become part of the monitoring group by the Safety vessels.

Eagle Police Helicopter is to maintain their own airborne safety in relation to their airspace management.

SLNZ Surf Lifesaving New Zealand

SLNZ staff who deploy in an IRB will monitor and maintain their own safety. This is the vessels master's responsibility. Any role players who are transported or taken aboard an SLNZ vessel will be placed into a Lifejacket/PFD that will be provided by the IRB crew.

If Westpac Rescue Helicopter wet winching

If wet winching is to be completed for persons in the water by a Westpac Rescue Helicopter, the **Safety Officer** will ensure there is sufficient separation of this small group so as not to endanger any person. This group will be getting into a 4-person life raft which will be deployed out of the Eagle Helicopter. Westpac Helicopter have indicated that their rescue swimmer will instruct the occupants to climb onto the roof of the raft, collapsing it down and arrange for winching operations to begin. This method limits the ability for the life raft to be as affected by the rotor wash increasing its stability with weight.

The people being winched by Westpac Rescue Helicopter will be identified in advance and will be wearing [Blue or White Helmets](#)

PWC will maintain radio contact with the **Safety Officer** and winching will only be authorised once the **Safety Officer** is happy with the location and circumstances.

All other safety vessels and swimmers to maintain their own safety and awareness of rotor wash and the effects of restricted hearing and sight.

Comms: When the Westpac Rescue Helicopter is on scene and staging to begin winching, the **Safety Officer** will announce on VHF CH77 **"All Clear Westpac to commence winching"**

The Helicopter is to complete two separate winch serials from water to the Reconciliation point to ensure that the Media team can capture both pickup and drop off moments.

Westpac Rescue Helicopter is to maintain their own airborne safety in relation to their airspace management.

If SEA Sprite 6 Squadron Rescue Helicopter wet winching

If wet winching is to be completed for persons in the water by a NZDF Helicopter, the **Safety Officer** will ensure there is sufficient separation of this small group so as not to endanger any person. This group will have the PWC as the safety vessel for its manoeuvrability and ability to uplift the swimmers quickly if required.

Only NZDF personnel can be wet winched by the Sea Sprite and these people will be identified in advance and will be wearing **Yellow NZDF Helmets**

PWC will maintain radio contact with the **Safety Officer** and winching will only be authorised once the **Safety Officer** is happy with the location and circumstances.

All other safety vessels and swimmers to maintain their own safety and awareness of rotor wash and the effects of restricted hearing and sight.

Comms: When the Sea Sprite Helicopter is on scene and staging to begin winching, the **Safety Officer** will announce on VHF CH77 **“All Clear Sea Sprite to commence winching”**

NZDF Sea sprite Rescue Helicopter is to maintain their own airborne safety in relation to their airspace management.

Ports of Auckland – Captain Cook Wharf protocol.

The Secure area of the Ports space marked “By the green box” has been allocated a space for this SAREX. This space will be accessed by one point which is the yellow sliding gate in the bottom left corner. This will be manned by a security guard who will only allow authorised persons through. If there is any question, the security guard will contact the Activity Supervisor Sgt Peter COMER on 021 1910047

Every person operating within the SAREX area at the Ports of Auckland must wear a Hi-Vis vest. (Except for the role players coming off the ferry who will all be captured and contained at the reconciliation point) All lifejackets when removed need to be secured together to prevent loss or the ability to be caught by wind and moved.

Every person operating within 1.5m of the water where there is no barrier must be wearing a floatation device of some description.

Every person operating within the SAREX area must remain within the area and not wonder off outside the secure area. Once you leave the Secure area operated by the Ports of Auckland, you will be deemed to have finished the SAREX and will not be allowed re-entry.

No unauthorised persons are to enter the helicopter landing zone area once FENZ have established it and clearly defined the area.

All persons arriving on the blue floating pontoon must not congregate on the pontoon but instead move safely to the top as directed. (Reconciliation point)



Reporting

Any Accident, Incident or Mishap involving any of the safety vessels shall be made aware to the **Safety Officer** who will ensure that proper reporting procedures are followed with MNZ by the vessels Master.

Safety is the responsibility all persons participating in the exercise.

DOES ANYONE HAVE ANY QUESTIONS ABOUT SAFETY OR CONDUCT OF THE DAY???

OUTLINE CONDUCT OF THE DAY:

Vessel used for SAREX.

Fullers Ferry “Te Kotuku”,

Capable of holding 400 pax

35m Long



Scenario:

How this scenario executes will be determined by the Incident Management Team (IMT). Exercise Control will provide impromptu injects to guide the response as required but it is expected to go something like this:

At approximately 0800 – 0830 hours a Fullers ferry will depart from the Ferry Basin, Auckland with passengers on board heading to Hobsonville.

As the Ferry is approaching Kauri Point a fire will instantly break out. Location of the fire will be in the engine room. The fire will be sufficient to cause multiple passengers to leap from the ferry, some with burns/injuries.

Some passengers will remain on the ferry, again some with injuries.

The Ferry crew will commence their fire drills which include transmitting a distress call on VHF Channel 77 to the Maritime Operations Centre. This information will be immediately relayed to the Police Communication Centre, and an Incident Management Team (IMT) will be stood up.

Due to the confined location, the ferry will deploy their anchor so not to drift. Once safely anchored, they will shut down their engines. An industrial smoke machine along with orange smoke flares will be activated.

FENZ and SERT Paramedics will deploy from the Marine Rescue Centre.

The crew on the Ferry will fight the fire but control of the fire is not immediately contained. They will then prepare to abandon ship, launching their life raft and moving persons outside onto the decks.

A causality clearance point will be set up at Captain Cook Wharf by local Police staff. St John and FENZ will also respond to this location and establish their forward command for further assets to deploy from. This will be formally known as the Beach Head.

The first asset to arrive on scene should be the Police Eagle Helicopter, they will deploy a life raft from the helicopter. Westpac should also be tasked and arrive on scene. Westpac will put a paramedic into the water and winch one onto the ferry who will start triaging patients. Westpac will winch patients from the life raft.

6 Squadron will be returning from a sortie to Whenuapai and will hear the Mayday Transmission from the Ferry. They will immediately respond and are winch capable and announce their availability to the IMT on the VHF radio. Eagle will assume on scene coordination of the air assets while Westpac winches from the life raft, and 6 Sqn winch from the water. (6 Squadron can only winch NZDF personnel)

The helicopters can transport their winched participants to the causality clearance point at Captain Cook Wharf. This landing zone will be established by FENZ and controlled by FENZ.

When FENZ arrive on scene, they will fight the fire via suppression, getting the fire under control enough to allow rescue vessels to come along side and recover patients. There will be concern about the toxic fumes so all passengers will need to be evacuated from the vessel (Evacuate onto life raft).

FENZ and SERT (dependant on taskings requested by the IMT) will start triaging patients on board and will hand over patients to St John either on the vessel, or transport and hand over to St John at the causality clearance point at Captain Cook Wharf.

Coast Guard crews will tirage those persons in the water and hand them over the St John with a full injury handover.

Once participants have been triaged and processed at Captain Cook Wharf, they will be deemed to be out of the exercise. The removal of their life jackets will signify they have been processed (once on land).

Search Assets will recover all persons from the water and the search will focus on the remaining missing persons. There will be at least two persons unaccounted for so the search will continue until Exercise Control calls for the demobilisation.

On demobilisation, all participants will be formally stood down before being released.