

Exercise Evaluation Report

2024 Eastern District SARex - Whakarauora Tangata

Location: Hawke's Bay CDEM Office, 309 Lyndon Road East, Hastings.

Date: Thursday 23rd May 2024.

Report version: Version 1.3

Evaluator(s): *Aly Curd – NZSAR Contractor*

Contents

- Executive Summary 2
- 1. Recommendations 3
- 2. Introduction 2
- 3. Background 2
- 4. Evaluation Methodology 4
- 5. Findings 6
- 6. Conclusions 8
- 7. Appendix A8

Executive Summary

The evaluation of the 2024 Eastern District Police Incident Management Team Exercise (IMTEX) – Whakarauora Tangata highlights a comprehensive analysis of the exercise, outlining its successes and identifying valuable opportunities for improvement. The participation of approximately 50 personnel across 16 agencies was a remarkable effort that showcased the commitment and collaboration within the Police and Search and Rescue (SAR) community across Hawke's Bay.

The exercise was evaluated to assess the effectiveness of the Incident Management Team (IMT) processes across six key objectives, revealing both commendable practices and areas needing improvement. The notification and activation procedures for the IMT were prompt, though the Mass Rescue Plan was found to be outdated and lacked adequate accessibility for supporting agencies. Roles and responsibilities were quickly identified, but tasking did not fully align with the latest Coordinated Incident Management System (CIMS) guidelines, indicating a need for further training and adherence to updated protocols.

Leadership was strong and provided direction, the command-and-control frameworks were effectively initiated ensuring a swift response to the incident. The strong engagement and coordination with key stakeholders, including emergency services, support agencies, and volunteer organisations, demonstrated the team's capability to mobilise resources and expertise efficiently. Furthermore, the professionalism and dedication of the IMT members were evident throughout the exercise, highlighting their commitment to improving search and rescue operations. These strengths provide a solid foundation upon which to build and enhance future response efforts.

The key recommendations from this exercise include updating plans and revise SOPs, improving training on CIMS roles, enhancing health & safety capabilities, enhancing documentation practices, developing a more inclusive information-sharing system, and incorporating long-term planning into initial response efforts. These improvements aim to ensure a more coordinated, efficient, and sustainable SAR response.

1. Recommendations

Recommendation One: Review of Plans.

Establish a routine for practising and regularly reviewing plans to enhance preparedness. Ensure all IMT personnel are well-informed and trained in these plans and the operational requirements. This proactive approach will contribute to organisational readiness and effectiveness in response.

Recommendation Two: Health and Safety.

Implement a proactive approach to safety management by establishing a Safety Function within the IMT from the outset of the response. Develop a comprehensive Safety Plan that addresses health and safety concerns raised by support agencies, ensuring their input is integrated into the overall action plan. Additionally, conduct regular safety briefings and training sessions to reinforce safety protocols and procedures throughout the response to enhance overall response effectiveness.

Recommendation Three: Common Operating Picture.

Establish a dedicated information-sharing platform to ensure situational awareness. This needs to be accessible to all relevant agencies and introduce visual information boards for real-time updates to address the issue of supporting agencies lacking situational awareness due to restricted access to information. Additionally, conduct regular training sessions to ensure a common operational picture during SAR incidents, enhancing coordination and response effectiveness across functions and agencies.

Recommendation Four: Coordinated Incident Management System Training.

Ensure all personnel involved in Police IMT are adequately trained in CIMS 3rd edition and have opportunities to apply their training within specific roles. CIMS is an integral part of incident management and enables personnel to respond effectively to incidents through appropriate coordination across functions and agencies. Rather than rotating personnel across multiple functions, focus on role specialisation to build expertise. Continuous practice and reinforcement in designated roles will enhance the team's effectiveness and ensure optimal incident management across functions and agencies.

Comments:

The comments below are observations from this exercise that do not related directly to the objectives evaluated against. They are included here to have their relevance recorded.

Develop a nationally consistent Reconciliation process that incorporates a multi-agency response. Ensure active consultation and input from both lead and support agencies to establish a unified and effective framework for the reconciliation process. This collaborative approach will enhance coordination and clarity during post-incident reconciliation efforts.

Revise the Mass Rescue Plan to align with current incident management standards, specifically CIMS 3rd edition, to ensure clarity and effectiveness during response operations.

Identify and adopt a nationally consistent Incident Management System for a Common Operating Picture for Search and Rescue Operations. This will eliminate confusion and enhance coordination. Provide comprehensive training to ensure IMT are proficient in using the selected system.

2. Introduction

The New Zealand Search and Rescue (NZSAR) Council's role is to provide strategic governance to the SAR sector. Part of this role is to maintain a SAR strategy which includes risk management through the [Risk Matrix](#).

The NZSAR Risk Matrix includes a "Nationally Significant Search and Rescue Event" (page 6), which is described as "*certain search and/or rescue events may overwhelm normal SAR capabilities and trigger the involvement of the National Security System*."

The Risk Matrix states the consequences of a nationally significant SAR event include significant numbers of people injured or killed that could have been rescued, severe reputational damage to SAR agencies, and severe reputational damage to New Zealand as a tourist destination.

The [Whakarauora Tangata Nationally Significant Search and Rescue Exercise Series](#) has been developed to test the current NATSIG SAROp plans and frameworks as part of the NZSAR Risk Matrix.

Whakarauora Tangata Eastern District NATSIG SAREx has the following components:

1. Police-led Integrated IMT support to a nationally significant Category II SAR (23/5/24), focusing on:
 - Escalation and establishment of Police-led multi-agency integrated IMT;
 - Activation, integration and liaison with supporting agencies (e.g. CDEM, MFAT, MBIE, Customs, health-sector, etc);
 - IMT *support* of local SAR coordination; and
 - IMT coordination of reconciliation management and welfare activities.

2. Possible functional mass rescue exercise dates TBC led by Eastern District Police SAR focusing on:
 - Coordination of search assets;
 - Rescue and recovery of passengers;
 - Registration, reconciliation and associated welfare requirements of those rescued;
 - DVI considerations.

3. Background

3.1 Background to the Exercise

Every year, the New Zealand Search and Rescue Council (NZSAR) provides funding to each of the 10 Police Districts responsible for search and rescue (SAR) to enhance their capabilities in planning, monitoring, evaluating, and debriefing SAR activities. While tactical operations are well practiced through annual exercises, frequent SAR operations nationwide, and regular SAR agency training and drills, National Significant Incident Group (NATSIG) SAR operations have not been conducted in recent years, and major SAR events have not been rehearsed at the national level for some time.

The objective was to conduct an operational-level functional exercise of a Police-led Integrated Incident Management Team (IMT) to ensure a Category II SAR operation was identified and responded to effectively, with multiple agencies collaborating towards a common mission.

All agencies, participants, observers, and Exercise Control (Excon) staff of Exercise Whakarauora Tangata assembled at the Hawke's Bay Civil Defence Emergency Management Group, where the IMT was established in a large operating space. Exercise Control (Ex-con) was staged at the Hastings Police Station. This combined functional and desktop exercise required participants and participating agencies to follow their plans and procedures as they would in a real situation, except where otherwise informed. The exercise was conducted in real-time, allowing participants to practice handling a range of issue.

3.2 Dates, location, organising agency(s), key people

Date: Thursday 23rd May 2024.

Location: HBCDEM Office, 309 Lyndon Road East, Hastings.

Organising Agency: New Zealand Search and Rescue

3.3 Participating organisations

- Eastern Police SAR District
- Iwi liaison staff
- Te Puni Kōkiri
- Surf Lifesaving New Zealand
- Land Search and Rescue New Zealand
- Coastguard New Zealand
- Hawke's Bay Regional Council
- Hawke's Bay Civil Defence Emergency Management
- Hato Hone St John
- New Zealand Red Cross
- Fire and Emergency New Zealand
- Oranga Tamariki
- Maritime New Zealand Rescue Coordination Centre
- New Zealand Defence Force

- SRSL Rescue Helicopters
- Health New Zealand

3.4 Exercise aim

The purpose of this exercise is to rehearse skills, processes and procedures for the district-level Incident Management Team and test the efficacy of existing or new plans.

The benefits of multi-agency exercises working and training together are widely known and vital to assist us in our ongoing preparedness. We will be testing our processes and systems including CIMS against our current pool of resources and technologies in order to refine them and be match fit for the real thing.

3.5 Exercise objectives

The overarching objectives for this exercise were:

1. Validate notification/activation procedures of IMT in the context of a SAR incident
2. Clarify roles and responsibilities within and across agencies
3. Practice command and control frameworks
4. Evaluate current and developing plans to identify deficiencies
5. Evaluate capacity to meet SAR/NSS obligations
6. Practice and evaluate reconciliation processes

3.6 Exercise Scenario

The scenario for Exercise Whakarauora Tangata centred around a boutique cruise ship, the Silver Pacific II, experiencing an incident on departure from Napier. A MAYDAY was received from the cruise ship Silver Pacific II at approximately 1905hrs on Thursday 23rd May 2024. The simulated ship was approximately 350-400ft, with 256 crew and passengers on board.

The initial mayday call, advised of an engine room fire out of control with fire suppression systems failing and a subsequent explosion compromising that starboard side of the hull. The vessel has no means of propulsion and are operating on emergency power. The vessel was located approximately 5Nm NE of Cape Kidnapper and drifting to the west.

The situation presented required coordination across Search and Rescue Coordinating Authorities, SAR agencies and supporting organisations; and poses a significant strain on the local and national resources. Additionally, the scenario included complexities that create a nationally significant incident, requiring national-level coordination and management.

Specifics of the scenario and its timeline were held in confidence by the exercise planning team to provide participants with a realistic experience, within the constraints of the exercise.

4. Evaluation Methodology

4.1 The agreed outcomes of the evaluation activity

It was agreed that a written report be produced summarising the overarching exercise objectives (listed above). Recommendations were to be made based on these objectives and the observations from the IMTEX.

4.2 Evaluation scope

The evaluation scope was primarily focused on the Eastern Police District Incident Management Team support to a nationally significant Category II SAROP. This included evaluating:

- Activation of local area Police SAR;
- Escalation and set up of district IMT;
- IMT support and coordination of local SAR and supplementary activities; and
- Management of reconciliation and welfare support.

To measure how well the exercise met the stated purpose through the evaluation objectives and supporting KPIs.

4.3 Aspects of the exercise observed, what was not observed

The data collection methodology evolved around three key methods: Observation, interview and document analysis.

Observation method took an overt and direct approach to understand the process, systems and situation awareness as it developed in the Incident Management Team (IMT). Aspects observed in the IMT included the IMT structure, CIMS knowledge, briefings, systems and processes, operations and outputs.

An exercise evaluation form was utilised with a checklist that could be ticked off as objectives, and KPIs were observed as either met, partially met, or not met. This allowed for less disruption on the participants during the exercise.

There were limitations in this approach as the lead evaluator being unable to observe all aspects of the exercise. A second evaluator and the NZSAR contractor provided support on gathering evidence and observations and reported back to the lead evaluator.

When aspects from the observation method were missed, an informal interview approach was adopted to ensure that information was captured. This approach was implemented as a last resort.

Additionally, a document analysis of action plans, situation reports, spreadsheets, and tasks completed was available after the exercise and provided a comprehensive insight into the outputs of the exercise. This allowed for any outstanding objectives and KPIs to be assessed.

The purpose of this evaluation was to evaluate process in line with the objectives, not individuals.

4.4 The process followed in preparing and submitting the report

Professional conduct and protocols were agreed upon with the exercise planners and NZSAR prior to the exercise commencing.

- The NZSAR Exercise Evaluation Form provided the foundation for data collection and assessment.
- The [Code of Conduct for Evaluation in the United Nations System](#), and the United Nations [UNDP Evaluation Guidelines](#) to ensure ethical and professional standards were adhered to.

The initial exercise evaluation form was completed. Aspects of the form were highlighted to show any areas that were missed or needed clarification. This was sent to exercise evaluation team and NZSAR Contractor.

Once feedback was received ratings and comments were amended and sent back for final approval. This was then incorporated into the report.

4.5 Other information

The exercise was based on the initial start-up and the first operational period of an IMT during a Nationally Significant Search and Rescue Operation. This exercise lasted 8 hours approx. An Evaluator was present in the IMT at all times.

5. Findings

Objective One: Validate notification/activation procedures of IMT in the context of a SAR incident.

The identification and activation of the incident were efficiently handled, with the Mass Rescue Plan, MOC, and DVI procedures activated by 0840hrs, and key stakeholders informed by 0900hrs. However, the Mass Rescue Plan requires an update to align with the CIMS 3rd edition, as it currently references outdated protocols from the 1988 CIMS 1st edition. This discrepancy includes the omission of key functions like “Welfare” and outdated terminology. Additionally, only one physical copy of the plan was available in the IMT, limiting access for supporting agencies and potentially hindering an integrated response.

Objective Two: Clarify roles and responsibilities within and across agencies.

Roles and responsibilities were promptly identified, with the Lead Coordinating Authority and support agencies understanding their tasks, fostering effective interagency collaboration. Existing relationships between agencies facilitated this cooperation. However, there was confusion in tasking that did not align with the CIMS 3rd edition, such as assigning rostering to Planning instead of Logistics, tasking Operations initially with writing the Incident Action Plan, and tasking Welfare with managing the wellbeing of “personnel” which should have been tasked to Logistics. Although role cards were available, they were underutilised, indicating a need for better training and adherence to role-specific guidelines to prevent role confusion and ensure a smooth operation.

CIMS is an integral part of incident management and enables personnel to respond effectively to incidents through appropriate coordination across functions and agencies. Although, training alone is not sufficient. It is essential that personnel not only understand and complete CIMS training but also have opportunities to apply the principles within their specific roles and organisations. There is often a perception that completing the CIMS course qualifies an individual to function across any role within the IMT, leading to frequent role changes. To ensure IMT is able to perform to its full capability, it is important to focus on ensuring personnel become “experts” in specific roles. This means that while individuals may be capable of performing a limited number of roles, they should not be frequently rotated across all functions in different exercises. Agencies should provide ongoing opportunities for personnel to consolidate and enhance their knowledge and capacity within specified roles. This targeted specialisation will lead to greater expertise and effectiveness in incident management.

Objective Three: Practise command and control frameworks.

The initial GSMEAC briefing was conducted with confidence and competence, establishing command and control early in the operation. Specialist groups, including Iwi liaisons, were integrated seamlessly into the IMT. Despite these strengths, the Initial Action Plan (IAP) development was delayed, impacting response coordination. The IAP was not fully compliant with standard CIMS processes, resulting in missing key information and a lack of detailed operational scheduling. Improving IAP development and documentation practices is essential for more efficient command and control.

Objective Four: Evaluate current and developing plans to identify deficiencies.

The response adhered to mandated frameworks, with internal procedures followed appropriately. Current and developing plans were evaluated for deficiencies, with internal procedures generally followed appropriately. Specialist groups were activated according to standard operating procedures, demonstrating the effectiveness of

current plans. However, the Mass Rescue Plan was underutilised by supporting agencies due to limited accessibility and outdated content. Additionally, the delayed establishment of a Safety Function hampered the timely identification and mitigation of health and safety risks. Updating the Mass Rescue Plan and integrating safety considerations from the outset are crucial for future responses.

Objective Five: Evaluate capacity to meet SAR/ODESC system obligations.

The capacity to meet SAR/ODESC system obligations was evaluated, revealing that key stakeholders were engaged early, with support requirements identified and implemented effectively, showcasing the capacity to sustain an operational response for the required duration. However, long-term and contingency planning were not documented, which could affect sustained response capability. The primary information management system, RIOD, was restricted to Police personnel, limiting situational awareness for support agencies. Developing a more inclusive information-sharing system and incorporating long-term planning into initial response documentation are necessary to enhance response sustainability and preparedness.

Objective Six: Practise and evaluate Reconciliation processes.

Reconciliation and Investigation teams successfully identified information needs and sourced appropriate data, maintaining accuracy and privacy, and adhering to data security standards. However, there was initial confusion between Investigations, Intel, Reconciliation, and Welfare regarding roles and responsibilities, which highlighted the need for clearer role delineation. Addressing this confusion promptly ensured a smoother operation, but it underscores the importance of clarifying roles and responsibilities from the outset to avoid similar issues in future responses.

6. Conclusions

In conclusion, the findings from the evaluation of the coordinated response to the nationally significant SAR incident provide valuable insights into the strengths and areas for improvement within the SAR sector's operational frameworks. While the response demonstrated effective identification and activation procedures, prompt establishment of command and control, and successful integration of specialist groups, several deficiencies were identified.

Key among these deficiencies are outdated and inaccessible response plans, role confusion within and across agencies, delayed establishment of critical functions like Safety, and limited information-sharing systems. These shortcomings highlight the need for comprehensive updates to existing plans, improved training on roles and responsibilities, early integration of critical functions, and the development of inclusive information-sharing platforms. The evaluation highlighted limitations with the current RIOD system and other mechanisms for sharing information, which reduced effective communication and coordination. Establishing more accessible platforms for information exchange is needed for improving situational awareness and facilitating timely decision-making during incidents.

Addressing these recommendations will not only enhance the SAR sector's capacity to respond effectively to future incidents but also strengthen interagency collaboration, improve situational awareness, and ensure the sustainability of response efforts over extended durations. By implementing these measures, the SAR sector can better fulfil its obligations and deliver more coordinated, efficient, and resilient responses to nationally significant incidents.

7. Appendix i: Key Performance Indicators

This appendix lists the objectives and sub-objectives and key performance indicators being used for evaluation of the exercise.

Met: The evaluation criteria were met in all instances – Partially Met: The evaluation criteria was met in some instances, but were incomplete tasks associated with these evaluation criteria – Not Met: The evaluation criteria was not met in any instance.

Practise unified control, across all levels, during a coordinated inter-agency response to a nationally significant SAR incident Assess or identify areas of particular risk or opportunity for the SAR sector in the coordinated response to a NATSIG SAROP			
NEP Objective	Contributing Ex Objective	Key Performance Indicators	Elevator Comment
NO 1.0 - Lead a coordinated interagency response to a significant incident or emerging threat that warrants a NSS activation.	CO 1.1 – Identify nationally significant incident or emerging threat.	KPI 1.1.1 Incident is identified as a nationally significant SAR incident requiring activation of the appropriate corresponding plan and/or agencies.	<p>Met. Controller had briefed Commissioner by 0840hr and enacted their Mass Rescue Plan, MOC and DVI procedures. The 105 number was set-up and running by 1005hrs.</p> <p>COMMENT: Revise the Mass Rescue Plan to align with current incident management standards, specifically CIMS 3rd edition, to ensure clarity and effectiveness during response operations. Update terminology and organisational structures to reflect modern practices, including the inclusion of a dedicated "Welfare" function and the separation of "Planning" and "Intel Manager" roles. Remove outdated references such as the Red Cross's MoU with Police, and incorporate relevant changes in procedures and protocols to enhance the plan's relevance and applicability to contemporary SAR incidents.</p>

		KPI 1.1.2 Lead Coordinating Authority for the response to the nationally significant SAR incident is identified, and communicated to all support agencies.	Met. Occurred at 0900 All of room GSMEAC briefing emphasising Category II SAROP with Police support.
CO 1.2 - Implement appropriate escalation measures that activate relevant elements of the NSS.		KPI 1.2.1 Appropriate reports are made to alert higher level HQ.	Met. Enacted by 0840hrs.
		KPI 1.2.3 Key stakeholders are identified and informed of the activation(s).	Met. Key players identified and briefed by 0900hrs. Those not present were requested.
CO 1.3 - Develop an effective action plan to manage the response to a Nationally significant SAR incident.		KPI 1.3.1 Planning processes are as established in standard operating procedures and CIMS.	<p>Partially Met. IAP was ready by 1122hrs (almost 2 ½ hours into the operation). Tasking and leadership was efficient and directive but taskings were not in accordance with CIMS 3rd edition. Example: At 0900hrs IMT briefing Planning was tasked with “rostering”. This should have been tasked to Logistic as part of their “Personnel” subfunction. Operations was tasked with development of the Initial Action Plan, a task that sits with Planning under the “Action Planning” sub-function.</p> <p>Welfare was tasked with managing the welfare of staff, a subfunction of “Field Staff Management” that sits as a sub-function of Operations. (CIMS 3rd ed.)</p> <p>RECOMMENDATION Ensure all personnel involved in Police</p>

			IMT are adequately trained in CIMS 3 rd edition. CIMS is an integral part of incident management and enables personnel to respond effectively to incidents through appropriate coordination across functions and agencies. This is particularly important for multi-agency IMTs.
		KPI 1.3.2 The action plan is phased in accordance with the Nationally Significant SAR plan/policy/framework.	Partially Met. RCC provided an IAP and SITREP in their initial briefing to the Controller. This was utilised for the initial IMT Function Lead Meeting in the form of a GSMEAC briefing to outline mission and intent at 0916hrs.
		KPI 1.3.3 Likely threats and associated consequences and risks are embedded in the action plan.	Met. Weather, terrain, dark/visibility, temperature, vehicles and fatigue were listed in the IAP.
		KPI 1.3.4 Relevant support agencies are integrated into action planning processes.	Not met. No documentation was evident that suggested support agencies were integrated into the action planning process.
	CO 1.4 - Coordinate the interagency response to the nationally significant SAR incident in accordance with the agency emergency plans, the action plan, CIMS, and legal/policy frameworks.	KPI 1.4.1 Response is managed in accordance with plans and within mandated frameworks.	Partially Met. The Hawke's Bay Mass Rescue Plan was emailed and available to all participating Police prior to the Exercise. This was not available to supporting agencies. There was only one physical copy sited in the IMT. All functions were prompted and directed to this document but there was minimal uptake and utilisation of this plan.

			<p>The response was managed within mandated frameworks as per the SAR Operational Framework for NZSRR</p> <p>The HB Mass Rescue Plan was out-of-date and requires a revision.</p> <p>RECOMMENDATION Establish a routine for practising and regularly reviewing plans to enhance preparedness. Ensure all IMT personnel are well-informed and trained in these plans and the operational requirements. This proactive approach will contribute to organisational readiness and effectiveness in response.</p>
		<p>KPI 1.4.2 The systems, processes and resources are appropriate for implementing the action plan, or adjusted to meet the needs of the situation.</p>	<p>Partially Met. IAP development was initially tasked to Operations. Once the IAP was developed by Planning it was 1122hrs. Key information was missing and consultation</p>
		<p>KPI 1.4.3 IMT delegates tasks to support agencies within legal frameworks and in accordance with RCCNZ requirements.</p>	<p>Met. Appropriate for scenario and within mandated requirements. Initial delegation of Welfare tasks (with exception to welfare of personnel) to CDEM was appropriate and inline with legislative mandates.</p>
		<p>KPI 1.4.4 Appropriate and timely reports are provided within command structures, and to coordinating authorities.</p>	<p>Met. IMT Function Lead Meetings were frequent, and timings were adapted to the tempo of the response. It took time for Coordinating Authorities to receive SITREPS from IMT. An Operational Schedule visible to the room would have</p>

			<p>been a benefit. Status updates were verbal, no documentation of these.</p> <p>COMMENT: If minutes are not taken as part of IMT meetings then a recording will allow for greater transparency and accountability for later investigation and review processes.</p>
	<p>CO 1.5 – Specialist functional groups are activated in support of the response.</p>	<p>KPI 1.5.1 Relevant specialist groups are identified and activated in accordance with standard operating procedures.</p>	<p>Met. A good representation of support agencies present. Internal Police procedures followed such as the activation of the MOC, DVI request and specialist SAR personnel from other regions. NGO groups such as Coastguard, Surf Lifesaving New Zealand, and Land Search and Rescue activated. Hospital and St John were engaged early. Iwi liaisons were imbedded into the IMT from the onset.</p>
	<p>CO 1.6 - Strengthen personal and interagency collaborative relationships.</p>	<p>KPI 1.6.1 IMT personnel work in a collaborative manner with colleagues from other agencies.</p>	<p>Met. IMT personnel and agencies collaborated well together. Existing relationships provided a solid foundation for support. However, there was an issue around access and sharing of information with RIOD only being available to Police personnel.</p>

		KPI 1.6.2 Information is shared and utilised across agencies to assist in relationship and resilience building.	Met. But as previously stated, the issue around situational awareness and information sharing with the main system utilised being RIOD. A Police system that only Police personnel has access to. There were TV screens with IAP and SITREPS visible to the main room but technical issues meant they were not always visible. SITREPS and IAPs were not numbered for timestamped.
Assess the effectiveness and suitability of existing SAR frameworks, memoranda of understanding, plans, procedures, systems, and processes. Increase knowledge and understanding of roles and responsibilities within and across SAR agencies and support agencies.			
NEP Objective	Contributing Ex Objective		
NO 2.0 - Support a coordinated interagency response to a significant incident or emerging threat that warrants a NSS activation.	CO 2.1 - Support the action plan in accordance with standard operating procedures	KPI 2.1.1 Support agencies contribute to the planning processes as established in standard operating procedures and CIMS.	Partially Met. IAP did not incorporate Support agencies managed their own SOPs to support the response in an efficient and effective manner. They were well organised. They could have been better integrated into the planning process.
		KPI 2.1.2 Liaison arrangements are maintained as required throughout the duration of the response.	Met. LO's were present and engaged throughout. It was good to see Lo's imbedded into functions utilising not only their subject matter expertise but also their CIMS knowledge.
		KPI 2.1.3 Threats and associated risks identified by the support agencies are embedded in the action plan.	Partially Met. There was no Safety Function established which made it difficult for support agencies to express their health and safety concerns. Safety

			<p>wasn't incorporated into IMT until 1303hrs. This is when Planning was tasked with Safety. No Safety Plan was developed for the entire exercise, However, during each briefing, the Controller inquired about risks, leading to the identification of operational and strategic risks, but specific health and safety risks were not clearly addressed.</p> <p>RECOMMENDATION Implement a proactive approach to safety management by establishing a Safety Function within the IMT from the outset of the response. Develop a comprehensive Safety Plan that addresses health and safety concerns raised by support agencies, ensuring their input is integrated into the overall action plan. Additionally, conduct regular safety briefings and training sessions to reinforce safety protocols and procedures throughout the response to enhance overall response effectiveness</p>
		<p>KPI 2.1.4 Support agencies develop action plans to detail the tasks assigned to them by the Lead Coordinating Authority or IMT.</p>	<p>Met. Health and St John enacted their own IMT and followed procedure. Red Cross was present and developed their planning in accordance with their role, as well as being imbedded with the Welfare team in IMT.</p>
		<p>KPI 2.1.5 Where appropriate, systems. Processes, legal and policy frameworks are used to support the action plan.</p>	<p>Not Met. Initial Action Plan contained minimal information (not SMART) and no reference to legal, policy or other relevant frameworks. RCC was referred</p>

			to and identified as the lead agency for Category II SAROP. Consolidated Action Planning not completed.
		KPI 2.1.6 As appropriate, site, local, regional and national levels of support requirements are identified and implemented.	Met. This was identified and addressed early with the establishment of the MOC, implementation of FLOs, DVI, Coroner considerations, and the additional support required for an extended operation.
	CO 2.2 Support coordination authorities in accordance with standard operating procedures.	KPI 2.2.1 Support agencies can support the inter-agency IMT as required by the lead Coordinating Authority.	Met. Each support agency understood their role and took direction from Police and RCC.
		KPI 2.2.2 Support agencies can sustain an operational response for the length of time required.	Met. Support agency rostering and personnel requirements were identified and managed accordingly.
Test new or developing concepts, plans, procedures, tools, and equipment Assess or identify areas of particular risk or opportunity for the SAR sector in the coordinated response to a NATSIG SAROP			
NEP Objective	Contributing Ex Objective		
NO 3.0 - Enable high level all-of-government decision making through the National Security System.	CO 3.1 Agencies fulfil their roles as expected in the National Security System response governance structures	KPI 3.1.1 Appropriate agencies are identified and contribute to the response in accordance with their mandated roles and responsibilities.	Met. All support agencies worked within their mandated roles. It was identified early that a Category II SAROP was in progress with RCC being the Coordinating Authority and Police being a support.
		KPI 3.1.2. There is a clear delineation in roles and responsibilities and appropriate tasking across agencies.	Partially Met. While the initial briefing to the IMT was conducted very well, there was confusion at the beginning regarding

		<p>CIMS roles. CIMS 3rd edition and the Mass Rescue Plan should have been used as guides for each function to refer to ensure they were “sticking to their lane”. There were CIMS Role cards available on each desk which could have been utilised. IMT function staff may have noticed this issue but did not raise it due to the hierarchical nature of the police and the need to adhere to orders.</p> <p>RECOMMENDATION Ensure all personnel involved in Police IMT are adequately trained in CIMS 3rd edition and have opportunities to apply their training within specific roles. CIMS is an integral part of incident management and enables personnel to respond effectively to incidents through appropriate coordination across functions and agencies. Rather than rotating personnel across multiple functions, focus on role specialisation to build expertise. Continuous practice and reinforcement in designated roles will enhance the team's effectiveness and ensure optimal incident management across functions and agencies.</p>	
		<p>KPI 3.1.3. Future requirements beyond the immediate response, together with associated resource/aligned agency are identified and communicated.</p>	<p>Partially Met. Resource and personnel requirements were discussed early; however, no long-term or contingency planning documentation was recorded in RIOD.</p>

	CO 3.2 High quality information is used in decision-making	KPI 3.2.1 Information provided to decision-makers is of high quality and credible.	Partially Met. There was confusion on numbers from Investigation, Intel, Reconciliation, Welfare and St. Johns. This made it difficult for decision makers to get a clear picture of the situation.
		KPI 3.2.2 Information provided to decision-makers is subjected to a robust assessment process.	Met. Information shared was appropriate for the situation given the scenario.
	CO 3.3 Key stakeholders are consulted in the decision-making process.	KPI 3.3.1 All stakeholders are identified and consulted with in a timely manner.	Met. This was done well. Stakeholders were identified and consulted quickly and able to respond accordingly.
		KPI 3.3.2 Decisions are communicated to key stakeholders in a timely manner in accordance with standard operating procedures.	Met. This was identified early and majority of communication was in progress by 0930hrs.
Increase knowledge and understanding of roles and responsibilities within and across SAR agencies and support agencies.			
NEP Objective	Contributing Ex Objective		
NO 5.0 - Situational awareness is established and maintained during the exercise	CO 5.1 Incident information is effectively managed and communicated by all agencies involved in the response	KPI 5.1.1 Accurate information is communicated within agencies (vertically) in a timely manner in accordance with standard operating procedures.	Met. This was done well early on but tended to become more difficult as the response progressed.
		KPI 5.1.2 Information is communicated between agencies (horizontally) in a timely manner in accordance with existing communications policies, procedures, and MOUs.	Met. But it was noted in the debrief that at times information and situational awareness was uncertain.

		KPI 5.1.3 IT systems and processes are capable of sharing information in a timely manner.	Partially Met. RIOD was the information management system used but is a Police access system. Support agencies and staff who were not Police were unable to access information's, forms or taskings.
		KPI 5.1.4 All agencies have the appropriate equipment and resources to manage information effectively.	Not Met. See comment above.
	CO 5.2 Response documentation is correctly produced	KPI 5.2.1 Incident response documents (Action Plans, Situation Reports) are produced and disseminated accurately and in a timely manner to relevant stakeholders.	Partially Met. IAP and sitreps were updated and disseminated accordingly. Only Police personnel had access to this documentation in RIOD. Support agencies had no visibility. COMMENT: All documentation should be numbered, have a time and date as well as an operational period.
CO 5.3 Information is communicated within and across agencies to support reconciliation	KPI 5.3.1 The information needs for reconciliation are identified.	Met. This was done by the Reconciliation and Investigation team, as opposed to Intel. There was confusion at times on roles and responsibilities between Investigations, Intel, Reconciliation and Welfare. COMMENT: Develop a nationally consistent Reconciliation process that incorporates a multi-agency response. Ensure active consultation and input	

			from both lead and support agencies to establish a unified and effective framework for the reconciliation process. This collaborative approach will enhance coordination and clarity during post-incident reconciliation efforts
		KPI 5.3.2 Information is sourced from appropriate source(s).	Met. It took a while for the Intelligence Cycle to be implemented and information was skewed. Example, media reports of the Silver Shadow II having run-aground. Initial confusion on the name of the ship was rectified early but the first SIT-REP reported that it has "...run aground due to loss of power". This was rectified in the next SITREP.
		KPI 5.3.3 Information is verified for accuracy.	Met. See above.
		KPI 5.3.4 Appropriate actions are taken to protect data security, individuals' privacy and confidentiality.	Met. Nothing was observed to suggest otherwise. Although RIOD meant limited situational awareness for support agencies. It was good to see a secure platform being used to share information and data.
Increase knowledge and understanding of roles and responsibilities within and across SAR agencies and support agencies.			
NEP Objective	Contributing Ex Objective		
NO 6.0 - Manage and deliver public information management to	CO 6.1 Appropriate information processes and tools are used.	KPI 6.1.1 Timely, accurate, and clear information is provided to stakeholders and target audiences.	Partially met. Initial information sharing was limited but allowed for the response to progress.

establish and maintain public assurance and confidence in the response		KPI 6.1.2 Messages align with strategic and operational objectives.	Partially met. Initially by 1003hrs the key focus of messaging was on the 105, coronial and DVI processes which overshadowed practical messaging such as what to do if you find survivors on the beach, information on cordons, information about staying away from the incident etc. This was rectified with more direction at 1122hrs and once the team had linked up with MNZ/RCC and Police comms.
		KPI 6.1.3 Proactive messaging across the full range of platforms fills the demand for information and shapes the conversation	Met. Messaging across multiple Social Media Platforms as well as media stand-ups and media releases were developed for the scenario.
	CO 6.2 Coordinated and consistent public messaging is produced.	KPI 6.2.1 The PIM function is established and adopts and inter-agency approach.	Met. PIM Function was composed on multi-agency staff. There was confusion around who was responsible for the initial messaging but did liaise with RCC and Police Comms by 1122hrs.
KPI 6.2.2 The production and promulgation of public information is coordinated across agencies.		Partially met. PIM messaging could have been shared across agencies for accuracy checking before dissemination.	
CO 6.3 Messaging aligns with and supports the operational response and key objectives.	KPI 6.3.1 Messages are validated against high level communications objectives and released in an appropriate and timely manner.	Partially Met. Given the scale of the situation DPMC Strategic Communications should have been established. Unsure if this was discussed in the PIM space.	

	<p>CO 6.4 Timely and accurate information is delivered to those who need it.</p>	<p>KPI 6.4.2 Supporting agencies have a common understanding of the operational picture.</p>	<p>Partially Met. There were insufficient visual information boards, and all information was kept in RIOD, restricting access to police personnel only. As a result, supporting agencies lacked situational awareness and could not achieve an understanding of the common operational picture.</p> <p>RECOMMENDATION Establish a dedicated information-sharing platform accessible to all relevant agencies and introduce visual information boards for real-time updates to address the issue of supporting agencies lacking situational awareness due to restricted access to information. Additionally, conduct regular training sessions to ensure a common operational picture during SAR incidents, enhancing coordination and response effectiveness across functions and agencies.</p> <p>Identify and adopt a nationally consistent Incident Management System for a Common Operating Picture for Search and Rescue Operations. This will eliminate confusion and enhance coordination. Provide comprehensive training to ensure IMT are proficient in using the selected system.</p>
--	--	---	--

8. Appendix ii: Photo of the IMT




Figure 1 Exercise Control Inject Flow Chart

Inject #	Type	TIME SCENARIO	TIME ACTUAL	Subject	From (Recipient)	To	Role Play Character	Attachments	Primary Delivery Method	Resources	Comments	Missing Pax (Res. #)	Safe on board	Transport Reference	Accounted for (Survivors)
485	TV news	0:45	12:45	Pax travelling through Clifton Beach	EXCON	N/A	N/A	None	N/A	Rescue List # 10	LRA	78	15	SL52	15
490	Video	0:45	12:45	TV NEWS REPORT #3	EXCON	ALL PLAYERS	N/A	Links to YouTube videos	Projection / TV	TV or Projection screen in EOC		63			
492	Patient	0:50	12:50	Pax landed at hospital - Patient Triage	EXCON - HEALTH	HEALTH - Hawke Bay Hospital	N/A	Casualty Envelope	Hard-copy	Rescue List # 11		63	1	ZK-PT (3)	1
495	Imp	0:50	12:50	CAA restricts Airspace - NOTAM	Police Liaison Officer, RCCNZ	IMT	Rupert Friend (PLO)	None	Phone call			62			
499	PH Brief	0:55	12:55	EXCON STANDUP BRIEF	EXCON	N/A	EXCON COORDINATOR	None	Facilitator	N/A	5-10 minutes at from 1h:55-1h:56 each hour	62			
500	PH Event	1:00	13:00	Pax arrived at Hauonea Hall Pavilion	EXCON	N/A	N/A	None	N/A	N/A		62		SL52	
505	Surv	1:05	13:05	Arrived Passenger details	Police OSC	IMT	Police SAR Coord	None	Phone call	Rescue List # 8	Note some unknown names, abbreviations	62			LB 1
510	Surv	1:05	13:05	Patient Details	Local Police	HEALTH - Hawke Bay Hospital	Local Police	None	Phone call	Rescue List # 11		62		ZK-PT (3)	
515	Patient	1:10	13:10	Pax arrived at Hauonea Hall Pavilion - Patient Triage	EXCON - HEALTH	HEALTH - St John	N/A	Casualty Envelope	Hard-copy	Rescue List # 10	LRA	62		SL52	
520	Imp	1:20	13:20	Helicopter now available	EXCON - HEALTH	HEALTH - St John	N/A	None	Facilitator			62			
525	Imp	1:20	13:20	Social media from evacuees	PNHQ	IMT	Insp. A7 Wyssman (PNHQ)	Links to YouTube videos	Email			62			
530	Email	1:25	13:25	MNZ media briefing transcript	PNHQ	IMT	Insp. A7 Wyssman (PNHQ)	Maritime Press Conference Transcript	Email			62			
535	Surv	1:30	13:30	Arrived Passenger details	Police OSC	IMT	Police SAR Coord	None	Phone call	Rescue List # 10	LRA	62		SL52	
540	Imp	1:35	13:35	Helicopter now available	EXCON - HEALTH	HEALTH - St John	N/A	None	Facilitator			62			
545	PH Event	1:35	13:35	Pax transported to Memorial Park	EXCON	N/A	N/A	None	N/A	Rescue List # 13		62	2	ZK-HQ2 (2)	2
550	Surv	1:35	13:35	Captain and medic will remain with the vessel at this time.	Police Liaison Officer, RCCNZ	IMT	Rupert Friend (PLO)	None	Phone call	Rescue List # 'Onboard'	remaining onboard	60			
555	Surv	1:40	13:40	Cancelled flights	Silver SEES Shipping agent	IMT	Silver SEES Shipping agent	None	Phone call			60			
560	Surv	1:40	13:40	A3 but 2 crew abandon ship	Police Liaison Officer, RCCNZ	IMT	Rupert Friend (PLO)	None	Phone call			60			
565	Surv	1:45	13:45	Survivors washed ashore at Ocean Beach	Comms Centre	IMT	Comms Centre Operator	None	Phone call			60			

Figure 2 Exercise Control Inject Time-line

Tasks

Financial	T0024481	Filed	23/05/2024 23:30	Angela Hallett (AKG290)	Emergency Management	:
Accom Police staffing	T0024501	Complete for Review	24/05/2024 14:00	Michael Wallace (MWCF94)	Emergency Management	:
Staffing for IMT at HBCDEM- District Commander Operations	T0024486	Complete for Review	24/05/2024 12:50	Michael Wallace (MWCF94)	Emergency Management	:
Urgent request for SAR staff replacement	T0024522	Active	23/05/2024 15:10	Angela Hallett (AKG290)	Emergency Management	:
Staffing requests for exercise and also for the welfare centres	T0024482	Active	24/05/2024 02:00	Michael Wallace (MWCF94)	Emergency Management	:
SAR staff from other Districts	T0024485	Active	24/05/2024 00:20	Angela Hallett (AKG290)	Emergency Management	:
Search and rescue headlamps required	T0024484	Active	24/05/2024 01:00	Michael Wallace (MWCF94)	Emergency Management	:
Food for Search and rescue squads	T0024483	Active	24/05/2024 03:00	Angela Hallett (AKG290)	Emergency Management	:
Mass fatality logistics support	T0024480	Complete for Review	23/05/2024 23:00	Michael Wallace (MWCF94)	Emergency Management	:
Clothing and blankets for passengers	T0024477	Active	23/05/2024 22:00	Michael Wallace (MWCF94)	Emergency Management	:
Set up venues for triage / welfare	T0024476	Active	23/05/2024 22:00	Michael Wallace (MWCF94)	Emergency Management	:
Lighting request for beach and ramp arrival locations	T0024475	Active	23/05/2024 22:00	Michael Wallace (MWCF94)	Emergency Management	:
Transport for persons arriving onshore from ship	T0024473	Active	23/05/2024 22:30	Michael Wallace (MWCF94)	Emergency Management	:
Food for survivors	T0024474	Active	23/05/2024 22:30	Michael Wallace (MWCF94)	Emergency Management	:

Figure 3 List of tasks assigned during IMTEX

Documents

INTEL - Situation Report Silver Pacific 2000hrs	Situation Report	23/05/2024 10:52	Chantel Slade (CSJHES)	23/05/2024 16:31	Chantel Slade (CSJHES)	:
INTEL - Situation Report 0230hrs	Situation Report	23/05/2024 16:29	Chantel Slade (CSJHES)	23/05/2024 16:29	Chantel Slade (CSJHES)	:
INTEL - Situation Report 0200hrs	Situation Report	23/05/2024 16:26	Chantel Slade (CSJHES)	23/05/2024 16:26	Chantel Slade (CSJHES)	:
INTEL - Situation Report 0300hrs	Situation Report	23/05/2024 16:22	Chantel Slade (CSJHES)	23/05/2024 16:22	Chantel Slade (CSJHES)	:
Shift handover template logistics	Reference Document	23/05/2024 15:39	Angela Hallett (AKG290)	23/05/2024 15:39	Angela Hallett (AKG290)	:
UPDATED PAX ARRIVAL	Photos	23/05/2024 15:27	Hannah Finnie (HFQB78)	23/05/2024 15:27	Hannah Finnie (HFQB78)	:
PAX ARRIVAL UPDATED	Incident Action Plan	23/05/2024 15:20	Hannah Finnie (HFQB78)	23/05/2024 15:20	Hannah Finnie (HFQB78)	:
PAX ARRIVAL UPDATED	Photos	23/05/2024 15:19	Hannah Finnie (HFQB78)	23/05/2024 15:19	Hannah Finnie (HFQB78)	:
INTSUM 0300hrs	Intelligence Summary	23/05/2024 15:18	Anna Higgins (AHACWB)	23/05/2024 15:18	Anna Higgins (AHACWB)	:
Staff numbers 23-24 May	Reference Document	23/05/2024 14:05	Andrew Graham (AGH009)	23/05/2024 14:05	Andrew Graham (AGH009)	:
PAX 0130 UPDATE	Photos	23/05/2024 13:31	Hannah Finnie (HFQB78)	23/05/2024 13:31	Hannah Finnie (HFQB78)	:
NAMES OF PASSENGERS	Reference Document	23/05/2024 13:16	Hannah Finnie (HFQB78)	23/05/2024 13:19	Hannah Finnie (HFQB78)	:
NAMES OF PASSENGERS (2)	Photos	23/05/2024 13:19	Hannah Finnie (HFQB78)	23/05/2024 13:19	Hannah Finnie (HFQB78)	:
NAMES OF PASSENGERS (1)	Photos	23/05/2024 13:18	Hannah Finnie (HFQB78)	23/05/2024 13:18	Hannah Finnie (HFQB78)	:
NAMES OF PASSENGERS	Photos	23/05/2024 13:17	Hannah Finnie (HFQB78)	23/05/2024 13:17	Hannah Finnie (HFQB78)	:
SAR Incident Action Plan Two	Incident Action Plan	23/05/2024 12:53	Philip Rowden (PRH451)	23/05/2024 12:53	Philip Rowden (PRH451)	:
PAX ARRIVED CCP HAUMOANA UPDATE	Photos	23/05/2024 12:42	Hannah Finnie (HFQB78)	23/05/2024 12:42	Hannah Finnie (HFQB78)	:
HZDF local staff available	Command Chart	23/05/2024 12:41	Nigel Hurley (NHE724)	23/05/2024 12:41	Nigel Hurley (NHE724)	:
END INSTUM Silver Pacific 0000hrs	Intelligence Summary	23/05/2024 12:28	Anna Higgins (AHACWB)	23/05/2024 12:28	Anna Higgins (AHACWB)	:
INTEL - Situation Report Silver Pacific 11 0000hrs	Situation Report	23/05/2024 12:11	Chantel Slade (CSJHES)	23/05/2024 12:11	Chantel Slade (CSJHES)	:

Figure 4 List of documents produced during IMTEX




Figure 5 Incident Action Plan at 1228hrs



Figure 6 IMT Leadership at 0842hrs




Figure 7 Hawkes Bay Police Mass Rescue Plan




Figure 8 Welfare Team reconciling passengers from Civil Defence Centres



Figure 9 IMT at ex-end




Figure 11 Intelligence board at 1048hrs

Mission statement

To support the rescue, recovery, and welfare of all persons from the cruise ship to a place of safety and repatriation.

Commanders Intent

1. Head all on shore activities
2. To cohesively work as joint agencies in a calm manner
3. To prioritise rescue and identification of victims to efficient and accurate reconciliation.

Figure 10 Mission and Commanders Intent