

# Exercise Evaluation Report

## 2023 Southern District SARex - Whakarauora Tangata

**Location:** Marakura Yacht Club, 96 State Highway 95, Lake Te Anau

**Date:** 20/11/2023

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**Evaluator(s):** *Aly Curd – NZSAR Contractor*

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## Executive Summary

The evaluation of the 2023 Southern District SAREx – Whakarauora Tangata highlights a comprehensive analysis of the exercise, outlining its successes and identifying valuable opportunities for improvement. The participation of 200 personnel across 14 agencies was a remarkable effort that showcased the commitment and collaboration within the Search and Rescue (SAR) community.

The exercise demonstrated the proficiency of SAR field teams and their dedicated focus on health, safety, and well-being management. The proactive engagement of personnel in introspective reflection showcased a commitment to learning and continuous improvement, despite facing challenges in planning, coordination, and information management.

Mission objectives were set, however there were inconsistencies noted. Gaps in knowledge and visibility affected the implementation of planning processes and CIMS functions. Control structures were in place, yet resource tracking and consultation with support agencies presented challenges. Despite effectively identifying and analysing operational risks, issues in communication systems and intelligence cycle utilisation impacted information management.

The lessons identified from the exercise provide valuable insights for future training programs. Integrating these lessons into response protocols and regularly reviewing SOPs will contribute to a culture of continuous improvement. Recognising the successes achieved, the exercise also highlights the importance of comprehensive training, standardised processes, and enhanced collaboration among SAR groups and support agencies.

Key recommendations include prioritising personnel training in CIMS 3rd Edition, enhancing leadership capabilities within the IMT, establishing routine plan reviews for preparedness, and conducting regular multiagency training sessions. These initiatives will further strengthen the SAR community's readiness and effectiveness in responding to future challenges.

# 1. Recommendations

**Recommendation One:** Ensure all personnel involved in SAR IMT are adequately trained in CIMS 3<sup>rd</sup> edition. CIMS is an integral part of incident management and enables personnel to respond effectively to incidents through appropriate coordination across functions and agencies. This is particularly important for multi-agency IMTs.

**Recommendation Two:** Establish a routine for practising and regularly reviewing plans to enhance preparedness. Ensure all IMT personnel are well-informed and trained in these plans and the operational requirements. This proactive approach will contribute to organisational readiness and effectiveness in response.

**Recommendation Three:** Enhance leadership capabilities within the IMT. Support key role holders with targeted leadership development opportunities. This will enable them to identify uncertainty, provide strong mentorship, and ensure successful delivery of outputs.

**Recommendation Four:** Ensure competency among all personnel involved in the Welfare Function of CIMS (Including Registration, Needs Assessment (NA) and Inquiry sub-functions) by providing training in SOPs and relevant systems. Implement regular practice sessions and reviews of plans to reinforce understanding. Additionally, ensure ongoing awareness and training for all personnel in the established plans and mandated frameworks, fostering a prepared and skilled team for efficient emergency response.

**Recommendation Five:** Conduct multi-agency training sessions and exercises on a frequent basis to familiarise personnel with agency capability mandates. This approach will foster a comprehensive understanding of each agency's role and responsibilities, facilitating collaboration and coordination during multi-agency response efforts.

## Comments:

The comments below are observations from this exercise that are of national relevance, and therefore beyond the scope of District responsibility. They are included here to have their relevance recorded.

Develop a nationally consistent Reconciliation process that incorporates a multi-agency response. Ensure active consultation and input from both lead and support agencies to establish a unified and effective framework for the reconciliation process. This collaborative approach will enhance coordination and clarity during post-incident reconciliation efforts.

Identify and adopt a nationally consistent Incident Management System for a Common Operating Picture for Search and Rescue Operations. This will eliminate confusion and enhance coordination. Provide comprehensive training to ensure IMT are proficient in using the selected system.

## 2. Introduction

The New Zealand Search and Rescue (NZSAR) Council's role is to provide strategic governance to the SAR sector. Part of this role is to maintain a SAR strategy which includes risk management through the [Risk Matrix](#).

The NZSAR Risk Matrix includes a "Nationally Significant Search and Rescue Event" (page 6), which is described as "*certain search and/or rescue events may overwhelm normal SAR capabilities and trigger the involvement of the National Security System*."

The Risk Matrix states the consequences of a nationally significant SAR event include significant numbers of people injured or killed that could have been rescued, severe reputational damage to SAR agencies, and severe reputational damage to New Zealand as a tourist destination.

The [Whakarauora Tangata Nationally Significant Search and Rescue Exercise Series](#) has been developed to test the current NATSIG SAROp plans and frameworks as part of the NZSAR Risk Matrix.

Whakarauora Tangata Southern District NATSIG SAREx has the following components:

- 1. RCCNZ coordination of nationally significant Category II SAR (11/10/23), including:**
  - Initial mayday and alert from vessel
  - Initial appreciation process
  - Activation of and coordination of SAR units, and
  - Integration of supporting Maritime NZ IMT.
- 2. Practical mass rescue exercise (18/11/23) led by Southern District Police SAR at Te Anau including:**
  - Coordination of search assets
  - Rescue and recovery of passengers
  - Registration, reconciliation, and associated welfare requirements of those rescued
  - DVI considerations
- 3. Police-led Integrated IMT support to a nationally significant Category II SAR (7/12/23), including:**
  - Escalation and establishment of Police-led Integrated IMT
  - Activation, integration and liaison with supporting agencies (e.g. CDEM, MFAT, MBIE, Customs, health-sector, etc)
  - IMT support of local SAR coordination; and
  - IMT coordination of reconciliation management and welfare activities.

The second component of this exercise known as **2023 Southern District SAREx – Whakarauora Tangata** took place on Saturday 18<sup>th</sup> November 2023 starting at 0700hrs.

## **3. Background**

### **3.1 Background to the Exercise**

Each year the New Zealand Search and Rescue Council (NZSAR) provides funding for each of the 10 Police Districts with SAR responsibility to enhance their capability to plan, monitor, evaluate and debrief these activities.

With each Police District undertaking annual exercises, frequent SAROps across the country, and regular SAR agency training and drills, it is felt that tactical level operations are well practiced. However, NATSIG SAROps have not occurred in recent years, and major SAR events have not been rehearsed at the national level for some time.

This year, the annual Southern District SAREx was aligned with the Whakarauora Tangata NATSIG SAREx series. This gave Exercise Planners an opportunity to test further aspects of SAR processes and procedures for response, specifically the reconciliation phase. The reconciliation phase being a critical aspect of SAROps presenting challenges which require a multi-agency approach.

The purpose of this component of the exercise is to test the operational aspects of the reconciliation process and implement the system and structure required to conduct a multi-agency response at the incident level.

### **3.2 Dates, location, organising agency(s), key people**

Saturday 18<sup>th</sup> November 2023, Lake Te Anau, Southern Police, Nathan White (NZ Police), Matt Sheat (NZ Police), Max Corboy (SLSNZ), Win Van der Velde (NZSAR)

### **3.3 Participating organisations**

- Southern Police SAR District including Southland, Coastal Otago, and Central Otago
- Te Rūnanga o Ōraka Aparima
- Surf Lifesaving New Zealand
- Land Search and Rescue New Zealand
- Amateur Radio Emergency Communications
- Coastguard New Zealand
- Environment Southland Harbourmaster
- Otago District Council Harbourmaster
- Hato Hone St John MIST Team
- Red Cross DWST Team
- Fire and Emergency New Zealand
- Milford Emergency Response Team
- Emergency Management Southland
- New Zealand Defence Force
- Southern Lakes Helicopters
- Te Whatu Ora Southern

### **3.4 Exercise aim**

Exercise Whakarauora Tangata aims to ensure SAR and supporting agencies can respond effectively to a nationally significant search and rescue incident.

The aim is to identify opportunities to improve current cross-agency strategies, procedures, capabilities, and capacity, to ensure that New Zealand is adequately prepared for a large-scale NatSig SAR event, which would stretch the availability of resources in the conduct of SAR and feature several distinct issues of varying levels of complexity. The rationale for the SAR ex is again be based in a remote location that poses significant real time risk. It is planned to bring groups of SAR volunteers, Police SAR squads and other government agencies like FENZ and Hato Hone St John from around Southern District together for a common purpose...to rescue people and save lives with NZ Police being the lead agency for the exercise.

The benefits of multi agency exercises working and training together are widely known and vital to assist us in our ongoing preparedness. We will be testing our processes and systems including CIMS against our current pool of resources and technologies in order refine them and be match fit for the real thing.

### **3.5 Exercise objectives**

**Objective One:** Develop an effective action plan to manage the OSC and regional response to a Nationally Significant SAR incident.

**Objective Two:** Coordinate the interagency response to the Nationally Significant SAR incident in accordance with the Coordinating Authority plan and tasking.

**Objective Three:** Establish and manage a robust reconciliation and registration process.

**Objective Four:** IMT effectively identifies and mitigates associated risk.

**Objective Five:** Establish SAR communication infrastructure.

**Objective Six:** Information is effectively managed and communicated during the response to ensure situational awareness across all stakeholders.

### **3.6 Exercise Scenario**

The scenario for 2023 Southern District SARex - Whakarauora Tangata was centred around a boutique cruise ship running aground and drifting in Doubtful Sound. The vessel was the Silver Pacific II, approximately 350-400ft, had approximately 250 crew and passengers. The simulation of this scenario was recreated in South Fiord, Lake Te Anau (see background to exercise).

Exercise planners provided scenario injects to players to simulate real-life information. Players who received injects were to respond as per their procedures – i.e perform an action, disseminate information, log information etc. All injects were clearly designated at “exercise only” or “Exercise Whakarauora Tangata” to ensure participants knew it was part of the exercise.

The scenario required coordination across SAR coordinating authorities, SAR agencies and supporting organisations; and will create a significant strain on the local and national resources. Additionally, the scenario will include complexities that create a truly nationally-significant incident, requiring national-level coordination and management.

## 4. Evaluation Methodology

### 4.1 The agreed outcomes of the evaluation activity

It was agreed that a written report be produced measuring the IMT against the objectives, sub-objectives and related KPI's. This will include any recommendations relating to the objectives.

### 4.2 Evaluation scope

To measure how well the exercise met the stated purpose through the evaluation objectives and supporting KPIs.

### 4.3 Aspects of the exercise observed, what was not observed

The data collection methodology evolved around three key methods: Observation, interview and document analysis.

Observation method took an overt and direct approach to understand the process, systems and situation awareness as it developed in the Incident Management Team (IMT). Aspects observed in the IMT included the IMT structure, CIMS knowledge, briefings, systems and processes, operations and outputs.

An exercise evaluation form was utilised with a checklist that could be ticked off as objectives, and KPIs were observed. This allowed for less disruption on the participants during the exercise. There were limitations in this approach as the lead evaluator being unable to observe all aspects of the exercise. A second evaluator and the NZSAR contractor provided support on gathering evidence and observations and reported back to the lead evaluator.

When aspects from the observation method were missed, an informal interview approach was adopted to ensure that information was captured. This approach was implemented as a last resort.

Additionally, a document analysis of action plans, situation reports, spreadsheets, and tasks completed was available after the exercise and provided a comprehensive insight into the outputs of the exercise. This allowed for any outstanding objectives and KPIs to be assessed.

The purpose of this evaluation was to evaluate process in line with the objectives, not individuals.

### 4.4 The process followed in preparing and submitting the report

Professional conduct and protocols were agreed upon with the exercise planners and NZSAR prior to the exercise commencing.

- The NZSAR Exercise Evaluation Form provided the foundation for data collection and assessment.
- The [Code of Conduct for Evaluation in the United Nations System](#), and the United Nations [UNDP Evaluation Guidelines](#) to ensure ethical and professional standards were adhered to.

The initial exercise evaluation form was completed. Aspects of the form were highlighted to show any areas that were missed or needed clarification. This was sent to exercise evaluation team and NZSAR Contractor.

Once feedback was received ratings and comments were amended and sent back for final approval. This was then incorporated into the report.



#### **4.5 Other information**

The exercise was based on the initial start-up and the first operational period of an IMT which lasted 7 hours approx. An Evaluator was present in the IMT at all times, with the exception being a briefing observed outside of the IMT between the controller and the Police District Commander, and when scenario clarification was sought from ExCon.

## 5. Findings

### Objective One: Develop an effective action plan to manage the OSC and regional response to a Nationally Significant SAR incident.

Overall, this objective was partially met. Positive progress was evident, key performance indicators (KPIs outlined below) highlighted areas for opportunity. Delayed initiation of the Initial Action Plan (IAP) was observed (KPI 01), but subsequent updates showed improvement with the inclusion of mission goals. A GSMEAC was developed early and displayed well. Steps were taken early in appointing CIMS Function Managers (KPI 02), although accessibility to CIMS materials and vests could be improved. The phased action plan exhibited room for enhancement (KPI 03), but positive trends emerged with later updates. While there is an area for opportunity, a positive approach is evident. The recommendation (below) highlights the importance of comprehensive CIMS 3<sup>rd</sup> edition training for all personnel to strengthen incident management capabilities.

#### KPI 01: Clear Mission and Objectives are set for each operational period. **Not met.**

A mission statement was set early (0730hrs) in the form of GSMEAC but not verbalised until an IMT meeting (0830hrs). The Initial Action Plan (IAP) was not considered until prompted by ExCon (0740hrs). As a result of this, action plan objectives were not set. Factors were considered and 3 x partial objectives were recorded in the IAP. See Figure 1. No strategy, actions or resource requirements were considered. No SMART Objectives were developed.

At 0900hrs, the IAP was added to with an update on number of Person on Board (POB) and a strategy included. Then at 1300hrs it was updated again to include the mission/operational goal.

By then end of the exercise, no full IAP or action plan had been developed. (See figure 2). At no time were the [New Zealand Search and Rescue Guidelines](#) referred to or incorporated into the operation.

**ACTION PLAN - INITIAL RESPONSE PERIOD**

Date: 18/11/2023 Time: 08:40

Operation Name: WAKANAIWA TANGRIA

Control / Coordination Centre Location: TEANAU YACHT CLUB

This Period Begins: 07:00 This Period Ends: 15:00

**Situation Summary:** Vessel Silver Pacific II from South French Lake Te Anau, approx 200 passengers. Last Power run agreement 07:40. N. 45 216.92 E. 162 345 9.01

**Incident Classification:** Typically LI

**Actions Already Taken:** Coastguard launched for initial area search.

**Operational Goal:**

**Diagram:**

```

    graph TD
      IC[Incident Controller: BONIFACE] --- Resp[Response: BRYAN B]
      IC --- M[Malloy: MALLOY]
      IC --- PIM[PIM]
      IC --- Safety[Safety: HOLEMAN]
      IC --- Int[Intelligence: FREER]
      IC --- Plan[Planning: COWIE]
      IC --- Ops[Operations: DONERTY]
      IC --- Log[Logistics: HOCKING]
      Int --- GS[GS Support]
      Ops --- Air[Air (Helicopter)]
      Log --- ASEC[ASEC]
      Log --- MSU[MSU/AU]
  
```

**Factors:** Water, Mass casualty, Land, Sinking Vessel, Weather, Water Conditions, Possible Oil Leaks

**Objectives:** Save & Rescue Passengers, Relocate to safe location, Account for 200 people.

**Strategies/Actions:**

**Resources Required/Assigned:**

**Follow Up Tasks/Other Actions:**

Figure 1 IAP photo taken at 0820hrs

**KPI 02:** Planning processes and CIMS functions are established in the IMT. **Partially met.** CIMS Function Managers were appointed, and personnel (from multiple agencies) were allocated to each Function in a timely manner. Templates were discussed and the Planning team made good use of these. However, at no time was a CIMS 3<sup>rd</sup> Edition manual seen in the IMT nor observed being utilised on personnel laptops. A “Function on a page” prompt was available for each function but underutilised. A Search Urgency was recorded but no “Planning P” model was discussed, or an IAP/action plan. Search Theory was not developed (when appropriate). CIMS vest were only available to Function Managers which made it difficult to distinguish who was who within the IMT.

**KPI 03:** The action plan is phased in accordance with requirements/taskings from the Coordinating Authority. **Not met.** Initial Action Plan was incomplete, and objectives were not SMART. SMART objectives are a basic requirement for an effective IAP. They provide a structured and specific framework that ensures goals are Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant, and Timebound, enhancing clarity, focus, accountability, and the likelihood of successful goal attainment. SMART Objectives form the basis of any successful emergency response. Action plans are an essential aspect of any emergency response. They describe the IMT objectives, tasks, measures and resources required to save lives and ensure a




Figure 2 IAP at end of exercise. Photo taken at 1514hrs

coordinated response. Without an action plan, an IMT faces disorganisation, unclear goals, and a higher likelihood of inefficiency or failure in achieving objective. This was evident within the IMT as Functions were unclear on what they were trying to achieve and began creating their own tasks. This resulted in silos developing and uncertainty on who was doing what within the IMT.

**KPI 04:** Risk Mitigation measures for likely threats and associated consequences are embedded in the action plan. **Partially met.**

The Safety Function within the IMT worked well with support agencies, Liaison Officers (LOs), field team members, and Functions within the IMT. A Safety Plan was developed and a safety board was displayed close to the entrance of the IMT in full view for those entering and exiting the premises. Safety was not a consideration of the IAP/ action plan since the IAP was not developed.

**KPI 05:** Relevant support agencies are integrated into action planning. **Not met.**

Support agencies were not consulted, considered or integrated into an IAP/action plan as this was not developed.

**Recommendation One: Ensure all personnel involved in SAR IMT are adequately trained in CIMS 3<sup>rd</sup> edition. CIMS is an integral part of incident management and enables personnel to respond effectively to incidents through appropriate coordination across functions and agencies.**

**Objective Two: Coordinate the interagency response to the Nationally Significant SAR incident in accordance with the Coordinating Authority plan and tasking.**

This objective was partially met. The evaluation identifies several areas for commendation and improvements. The establishment of appropriate control structures at various locations demonstrated adherence to CIMS terminology (KPI 06). There was confusion at the ground level which emphasised the need for broader CIMS training. Support and resource identification showcased comprehensive participation across 14 agencies, but challenges in resource tracking highlighted the necessity for streamlined communication (KPI 07). Effective maintenance of liaison arrangements and general adherence to plans were positive aspects, though formalised plans were underutilised (KPI 08, KPI 09).

The evaluation emphasised the importance of regular plan and review and personnel training for enhanced preparedness (see below for Recommendation Two). Notably, the lack of CIMS vests availability and inconsistent application of CIMS 3<sup>rd</sup> Edition revealed leadership and communication gaps within the IMT (KPI 10).

Interagency collaboration was maintained, but silos within the IMT led to a diminishing shared understanding and coordination (KPI11). Future requirements and long-term planning were overshadowed by immediate reflex taskings, indicating a need for a more comprehensive approach to post-response considerations (KPI12).

The evaluation highlighted areas of success and provides recommendations to strengthen coordination, communication and preparedness withing the interagency response.

**KPI 06:** Appropriate control structures are established in suitable locations; for example, a forward ICP, a main ICP and IMT. **Met.**

CIMS terminology was used including incident control point, safe forward point and assembly area. There was some confusion on the ground with field teams not knowing or understanding the difference with the terminology, but this isn't isolated to this exercise and requires more training overall in CIMS 3<sup>rd</sup> edition. It was noted that the staging area could have been stationed at a more appropriate facility in line with pre-plans and already developed SOPs.

**KPI 07:** Support and/or resources/effect required from other agencies are identified and requested. **Partially met.**

Approximately 200 personnel across 14 agencies participated in this exercise making for a comprehensive list of resources available to the IMT. Logistic identified assets available

in a timely manner but resource tracking and tasking was done using an online Incident Management System (IMS) SARTrack. This was managed by a Subject Matter Expert (SME) and incorporated in the Communication Plan and managed through the Logistics Function and AREC. This caused confusion within the IMT and a lack of awareness of this system led to misunderstanding of when teams had finished taskings, were available for re-tasking, and on a number of occasions, were unable to be tracked. This led to the classic “hurry up and wait” by field teams when their time and skills could have been utilised for taskings.

At 1330hrs the Police District Commander was briefed by the IC who was unable to confirm the number of personnel deployed on water or land. At 1336hrs Logistic and Operations Functions had lost sight of how many teams had been deployed and where they were currently in the field.

**KPI 08:** Liaison arrangements are maintained as required throughout the duration of the response. **Met.**

A good representation of LOs in the IMT and were often referred to and consulted with.

**KPI 09:** Response is managed in accordance with plans and within mandated frameworks. **Not met.**

At no time were the [New Zealand Search and Rescue Guidelines](#) utilised or referred to. They outline the 5 stages of operations that provide a reference point for a SAROp with guidance on response actions, responsibilities, and process.

It was evident that some agencies were not utilising their plans or SOPs. When evaluators were unable to gain clarity through observation an informal interviewing method was adopted. It became clear to the evaluators that personnel representing agencies were aware they had SOPs, plans and a mandated framework but were unaware of where these were accessible, and were not adequately trained in these processes.

In the absence of formalised plans being implemented, plans were developed in an ad hoc manner and verbalised between individuals, at no point was a plan or process recorded or clarified in written form.

An exception to this was St John, Te Whatu Ora Southern, AREC, and the Red Cross. All worked within their mandated frameworks, followed their SOPs, and could provide evidence when requested.

**Recommendation Two: Establish a routine for practising and regularly reviewing plans to enhance preparedness. Ensure all personnel are well-informed and trained in these plans and mandated frameworks. This proactive approach will contribute to organisational readiness and effectiveness in response.**

**KPI 10:** The response is managed using a CIMS framework. **Not met.**

Majority of the IMT were unidentifiable due to the lack of CIMS vests available.

Inconsistency in applying CIMS 3<sup>rd</sup> Edition, as evidence by late consideration of PIM, inadequate allocation for the Intelligence Function and no Investigation sub-function established within the Operations Function ([CIMS 3<sup>rd</sup> ed, page 51](#)).

There was confusion between Operation and Planning Functions on demobilisation plans and who had responsibility, reflecting lack of communication and a formation of silos that hindered effective coordination.

A lack of dedicated task planning teams, led to issues in troubleshooting and aiding overwhelmed areas, heightened the need for structured planning (such as an IAP and consolidated action plan).

Key role holders lacked the necessary experience and leadership skills for effective fellowship and product delivery. Inexperienced personnel were assigned Function Manager role without adequate training or mentorship, leading to a sense that they had been set up to fail. This dejectedness flowed through into the IMT which is evident in

outputs and deliverable.

At 1330hrs the operational rhythm was nil, with a lack of energy and no discernible product being delivered.

**Recommendation Three: Enhance leadership capabilities within the IMT. Support key role holders with targeted leadership development opportunities. This will enable them to identify uncertainty, provide strong mentorship, and ensure successful delivery of outputs.**



Figure 3 IMT Function Managers visible in CIMS vests. Photo taken at 1032hrs.

**KPI 11:** Personnel work in a collaborative manner with colleagues from other agencies. **Partially met.**

While interagency collaboration was maintained, notable silos within the IMT became apparent early in the process. These silos manifested as distinct operational functions operating with limited cross-functional communication and coordination. The initial collaborative efforts gave way to a lack of shared understanding, resulting in pushback on responsibilities and confusion regarding roles and the operation progressed.

**KPI 12:** Future requirements beyond the immediate response, together with associated resource/aligned agency are identified and communicated. **Not met.**

The identification and communication of future requirements were lacking in the response. The focus was predominantly on reflex taskings, neglecting long-term planning, contingency planning, and transition planning. There was a notable absence of a Demobilisation Plan, and considerations for handover only occurred following direction from the Police District Commander at 1330hrs. No formal briefings were documented beyond the original GSMEAC, and planning or resource requirements for the second operational period were not addressed.

A notable commendation though, was the ICs consultation with Te Rūnanga o Ōraka Aparima representative on the appropriateness of a Rāhui and the process involved.

**Objective Three: Establish and manage a robust reconciliation and registration process.**

This objective was partially met. The evaluation identified some shortcomings in achieving this objective, particularly in identifying information needs and establishing clear processes and procedures. The delayed consideration of this Information Collection Plan and discrepancies in passenger numbers indicated a lack of proactive planning and alignment in key activities for reconciliation.

One notable concern was the siloed approach of the Welfare/Reconciliation team, operating independently from the broader Incident Management Team (IMT). The absence of updates during the IMT meetings created a communication gap, hindering the Intelligence Function's comprehension of information needs and impending overall situational awareness.

Despite challenges, there were positive aspects, such as the implementation of a robust triage system by support agencies and the accommodation support developed by the Logistics Function. However, the decision to shift from an intended secure ArcGIS Survey123 system to a Google Doc spreadsheet raised concerns about comprehensive data capture and follow-up, impacting the needs assessment of affected individuals.

The recommendations (Recommendation Four and Five) for competency training, regular practice sessions, and the development of a nationally consistent reconciliation process aim to address these challenges. By fostering a prepared and skilled team, and promoting collaboration among lead and support agencies, these measures seek to enhance coordination and clarity during post-incident reconciliation efforts.

**KPI 13: The information needs for reconciliation are identified. Not met.**

The delayed consideration of the Information Collection Plan until 0913hrs and the first recorded item at 1136hrs reflects a lack of proactive planning for information needs related to reconciliation. This delay could impact the efficiency of the reconciliation process and hinder the timely acquisition of critical information.

The siloed approach of the Welfare/Reconciliation team, operating independently from the rest of the IMT, indicates a breakdown in communication and collaboration. The lack of awareness within the broader IMT regarding the reconciliation process further highlights the need for a more integrated and transparent approach to information sharing.

The absence of updates from Welfare/Recon during the 0958hrs IMT Meeting and the lack of representation at the 1041hrs IMT Meeting created a communication gap, making it challenging for the Intelligence Function to fully comprehend the information needs for reconciliation. This disconnect can impede the overall situation awareness and decision-making processes.

**KPI 14: Key activities required for effective reconciliation are identified, and clear processes and procedures established. Not met.**

Inconsistencies in passenger numbers reported during the 1141hrs IMT Meeting suggest a lack of alignment in the identification and recording of key activities for reconciliation. This discrepancy could compromise the accuracy of information and hinder the effectiveness of the reconciliation process.

The initial system for passenger registration using ArcGIS Survey123 faced challenges, prompting a switch to St John's numbering system. However, the adoption of a Google Doc spreadsheet for recording and tracking passengers raised significant concerns about privacy, security, and compliance with relevant regulations, such as the Privacy Act 2020 and recommendations from the Department of Internal Affairs (DIA).

The formal transfer of information between police and the Intelligence Function, initiated at 30-minute intervals around 1300hrs, encountered issues, as evidenced by the inability of the Intelligence Function to articulate the location of all recovered passengers during the IMT meeting at 1401hrs. This points to potential inefficiencies in the established processes and communication channels.

**KPI 15:** Appropriate space and logistics support is allocated to enable key activities to be undertaken. **Partially met.**

The triage system was identified as robust and comprehensive, indicating success in one aspect of key activities. However, the decision to shift from the intended ArcGIS Survey123 system to a simplified GoogleDoc spreadsheet raised concerns about the system's effectiveness for comprehensive data capture and follow-up, particularly regarding welfare needs. This decision may have impacted the ability to address the broader well-being of affected individuals.

The Logistics Function prioritised accommodation needs for displaced passengers, demonstrating a proactive approach to a specific aspect of welfare support. However, the lack of information regarding other welfare needs in both the incomplete Survey123 data and the GoogleDoc spreadsheet limited the overall understanding of the well-being requirements of those affected.

**Recommendation Four: Ensure competency among all personnel involved in the Welfare aspect of CIMS (Including Registration, Needs Assessment (NA) and Inquiry sub-functions) process by providing training in SOPs and relevant systems. Implement regular practice sessions and reviews of plans to reinforce understanding. Additionally, ensure ongoing awareness and training for all personnel in the established plans and mandated frameworks, fostering a prepared and skilled team for efficient emergency response.**

**KPI 16:** A clear process to hand personnel over to the appropriate agency/organization for onward movement and recovery is established. **Not met.**

The absence of a formal process between Police, CDEM, and the ship's agent, particularly regarding passenger handover for onward movement and recovery, indicates a gap in the response strategy. The focus on accommodation considerations suggests a limited understanding of the broader recovery requirements outlined in CIMS 3rd edition. While a process was completed, the lack of clarity raises concerns about the effectiveness and efficiency of the handover. Recovery considerations, a critical aspect of incident management and SAROps, were not adequately addressed, indicating a potential oversight in the response planning.

**KPI 17:** A single point of truth to show reconciliation progress is maintained throughout. **Not met.**

The disagreement in numbers provided by Intelligence, Reconciliation, and St John respectively, during the 1141hrs IMT meeting highlights a lack of synchronisation in reconciliation progress reporting. The absence of a single point of truth suggests a breakdown in communication and data consistency within the IMT.

Comment: Develop a nationally consistent Reconciliation process that incorporates a multi-agency response. Ensure active consultation and input from both lead and support agencies to establish a unified and effective framework for the reconciliation process. This collaborative approach will enhance coordination and clarity during post-incident reconciliation efforts.

**Objective Four: IMT effectively identifies and mitigates associated risk.**

The objective was **partially met**. The IMT demonstrated success in identifying and analysing operational risks, with the Safety Manager playing a crucial role in providing comprehensive safety considerations. Despite challenges, the team defined risk management systems



appropriate to the situation's nature and complexity, showcasing effective incorporation of risk management practices.

Briefing information was found to appropriately address identified risks, indicating a proactive effort to communicate potential hazards and promote a safety-conscious approach. However, the assessment revealed a partial meeting of KPI 21, as an incident involving Land SAR members boarding a Surf Lifesaving IRB without life jackets highlighted a gap in understanding personal responsibilities regarding safety measures.

The safety breach, observed during the initial safety briefing, led to escalation and rectification by the Safety Manager and ExCon. The incident emphasised the importance of addressing and rectifying lapses promptly. The evaluation recognised the IMT's commitment to safety measures and the continuous improvement of risk management processes.

Overall, the assessment provided valuable insights into the IMT's performance in risk identification and mitigation, outlining both strengths and areas for improvement.

**KPI 18:** Operational risks, both actual and potential, are identified and analysed. **Met.**

The Safety Manager followed appropriate processes and provided comprehensive safety considerations suggests a successful identification and analysis of operational risks. The use of well-documented and well-managed safety protocols indicates a proactive approach to risk management.

**KPI 19:** Risk management systems and processes appropriate to the nature and complexity of the situation are defined. **Met.**

The Safety Manager would have benefited from additional personnel appropriate to the size and scale of the exercise. However, was able to identify and incorporate risk management effectively and efficiently.

**KPI 20:** Briefing information appropriately addresses identified risks. **Met.**

The Safety Manager provided briefings to the Team Leader before each tasking implies a proactive effort to ensure that the briefing information included relevant details about identified risks. This practice suggests a commitment to addressing potential hazards and promoting a safety conscious approach to the exercise.

**KPI 21:** All participants understand their personal responsibilities regarding risk. **Partially met.**

During the initial safety briefing it was highlighted that no one was to board a vessel (including boats, IRBs and watercraft.) without a lifejacket, this was observed by the evaluators present.

The incident involving Land SAR members boarding the Surf Lifesaving IRB without life jackets indicates a gap in the understanding of personal responsibilities regarding safety measures. The fact that the safety breach was rectified underscores a partial adherence to the KPI.

An evaluator was present to witness this interaction at 0951hrs. It was identified by SLSNZ that there was an inadequate number of lifejackets for LandSAR personnel being deployed. Their initial solution was to board the vessel regardless of PPE requirements and just "travel slower". It was escalated to ExCon and the Safety Manager for follow-up and rectification. At 1010hrs the teams were called back the situation rectified.



*Figure 4 LandSAR and SLSNZ teams back on shore after casting off and being recalled to put lifejackets and helmets on. Photo taken 1019hrs.*

#### **Objective Five: Establish SAR communication infrastructure.**

This objective was **partially met**. The communication lines between the Incident Management Team (IMT) and field teams operated partially effectively. The Amateur Radio Emergency Communications (AREC) team identified communication issues and proposed solutions, leading to refinements and updates of a Communication Plan. While this demonstrated a proactive approach to addressing potential problems, the utilisation of separate communication systems, such as the SLSNZ radio system, contributed to deployment confusion. This resulted in a partial fulfilment of KPI 22, highlighting the need for improved situational awareness for field teams.

On a positive note, the assessment found that communication systems were operational in a timely manner, with AREC developing and following a Communication Plan. Additionally, the communication systems remained operational throughout the response period, ensuring efficient communication for the scenario with minor setback which is expected on an exercise of this scale. Specific measures, such as providing teams with Personal Locator Beacons (PLBs) and InReach devices, were implemented to address potential black spots and maintain effective communication.

While there were areas of improvement identified, the evaluation recognised the successful implementation of communication systems in a timely manner and their sustained operation throughout the response period.

#### **KPI 22: Communication lines between IMT and field teams operate effectively. Partially met.**

AREC identified comms issues and conveyed solutions to the IMT. This was developed into a Communication Plan, displaying a proactive approach to addressing potential issues. However, the utilisation of separate communication systems such as the use of SLSNZ radio system used to track and communicate with SLSNZ teams, resulted in deployment confusion. This lack of situational awareness for teams in the field, indicates a partial fulfilment of this KPI.

**KPI 23:** Communication systems are operational in a timely manner. **Met.**

AREC developed and followed a Communication Plan, which was available to the IMT, indicating that communication systems were operational in a timely manner.

**KPI 24:** Communication systems remain operational throughout the response period. **Met.**

Communications were efficient for the scenario, with specific black spots identified. Teams were equipped with Personal Locator Beacons (PLBs) and InReach devices in case of a “No Duff” situation while in a black spot. Cell phone reception was available for the majority of the exercise area, indicating that communication systems remained operational throughout the response period.

**Objective Six: Information is effectively managed and communicated during the response to ensure situational awareness across all stakeholders.**

The objective was partially met. The assessment highlighted areas where the IMT was successful and areas that needed improvement. The use of the Intelligence Cycle to ensure robust assessment and delivery of high-quality intelligence was not met (KPI 25), indicating a shortfall in systematic and comprehensive intelligence assessment. The need for an in-depth understanding of CIMS and Function responsibilities was emphasised to address these gaps.

Identification and consultation with stakeholders were partially met (KPI 26), with delays in recognizing stakeholders and understanding their roles. Information sharing within the IMT and across agencies was also partially fulfilled, with briefings conducted regularly but lacking structure and a proactive approach to updates and actions.

Information requirements for the next operational period were not considered, indicating a shortfall in addressing future information needs. Similarly, there was a lack of a clear understanding of a common operating picture across agencies, as indicated by challenges in using the SARTrack system and limited proficiency among IMT personnel. The comment to adopt a nationally consistent Incident Management System was proposed to enhance coordination.

Appropriate and timely reports within command structures and to coordinating authorities were partially met (KPI 27), with verbal updates provided but not documented. The absence of regular and timely reporting within the IMT raised concerns about the effectiveness of reporting structures.

While there were areas where the IMT demonstrated success, such as timely communication system operation and identification of operational risks, there were notable gaps in intelligence utilisation, stakeholder engagement, information sharing, and reporting structures that require attention and improvement for a more effective response.

**KPI 25:** The intelligence cycle is used to ensure information is subjected to a robust assessment process and decision makers are provided with high quality and credible intelligence. **Not met.**

The Intelligence Function was not adequately resourced. For this type of scenario it would be expected that high volumes of information would need to be collected, analysed, and disseminated in a timely manner and early on in the operation. This would ensure that the IMT were planning based on intelligence and not just information. Essential processes were not followed, and critical documentation was not developed.

The absence of the utilisation of the intelligence cycle, as well as limited displayed, suggest a shortfall in the application of a systematic and robust intelligence assessment. It also highlights the need for in-depth understanding of CIMS and Function responsibilities and deliverables.

**INFORMATION COLLECTION PLAN**

**NZSAR**  
New Zealand Search and Rescue

Operation name: \_\_\_\_\_ Time: \_\_\_\_\_  
 Prepared by: \_\_\_\_\_ Date: \_\_\_\_\_

Information Required	Source	Person/Team Assigned	Date/Time Assigned	Notes
	<del>SEARCH</del>			
PERSONS RECOVERY	RECON		11:20	MY FACE TO FACE WITH RECON.

Approved: \_\_\_\_\_ Date/time: \_\_\_\_\_

9/10

Figure 5 Information Collection Plan. Photo taken at 1136hrs.

**KPI 26:** All stakeholders are identified and consulted with in a timely manner. **Partially met.**  
 The IMT hesitated to identify who the wider stakeholders were and how they fit into the IMT. Stakeholders who were not present at the exercise, were not adequately considered. These included but were not limited to community, local transport operators, tourism operators, Department of Conservation (DOC), Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT), Embassy and high commissions.  
 The delay in identifying stakeholders and understanding their roles, coupled with the omission of key stakeholders without representation, indicates a partial fulfilment of this KPI.

**KPI 27:** Information is shared and relayed appropriately within the IMT and across agencies - briefings are conducted on a regular basis. **Partially met.**  
 Briefings were conducted hourly, but an operation schedule was not present in the IMT. A bell was rung to indicate when an IMT meeting was taking place and for any briefings within the IMT. However, no agenda was presented, updates were given in an ad hoc manner, and if a Function had not provided an update, they were not pressed on the matter. Additionally, no summary of actions was presented at the end of each meeting or briefing, and GSMEAC was only utilised once in the 0830hrs IMT meeting.  
 While briefings were conducted regularly, the absence of an operational schedule, a structured agenda, and a proactive approach to pressing for updates and actions indicates a partial fulfilment of the KPI.

**KPI 28:** Information requirements for next operational period are established and action taken to address these needs. **Not met.**  
 This was not considered for the IMT. The Police District Commander prompted this in a pressing manner, but it was not followed up.  
 The lack of consideration for information requirements for the second operational period, despite prompting, indicates a shortfall in addressing future information needs, essentially compromising the operation.

**INFORMATION COLLECTION PLAN**

**NZSAR**  
New Zealand Search and Rescue

Operation name: WAIKARARUA - TANGA TA  
Prepared by: FREER

Time: \_\_\_\_\_  
Date: 18/11/23

Information Required	Source	Person/Team Assigned	Date/Time Assigned	Notes
	<del>SEARCH</del>			
PERSONS RECEIVED	RECON	INTEL	11:20	MY FPC IS FPC WITH RECON.
LOCATION OF OTHERS?	OSC	INTEL	12:00	
<del>ONE IDENTIFIED</del> WAIKARARUA	OSC	INTEL	12:15	NOT POSSIBLE
PERSONS RECEIVED		INTEL	12:30	EVERY 30 MINS ON JAF HUB
WHAT TEAM LOCATED PLB	OPERATIONS	<del>SEARCH</del>	12:40	TEAM 5. 027 226 5012
WHERE OTHER PLB WITH PLB SUBJECT	TEAM 5	INTEL	12:41	

Approved: \_\_\_\_\_ Date/time: \_\_\_\_\_

Figure 6 Information Collection Plan at 1414hrs

**KPI 29:** There is a clear understanding of a common operating picture across agencies, and this is regularly updated. **Not met.**


Each SAR group within the Police Southern District operate their own Incident Management Systems (IMS) and are trained predominantly in these systems with limited use of manual templates, theory or application.

For this exercise the SARTrack system was utilised and a Subject Matter Expert (SME) was present to ensure the system ran efficiently. It was evident that few people in the IMT had experience let alone expertise in the SARTrack tool.

At 0958hrs IMT Meeting the question was raised on sharing of information within the IMT. This was when it was identified that most Function Managers were not proficient in SARTrack. The IC directed that Functions have a dedicated person to manage the system, yet most IMT personnel had limited knowledge and Functions struggled to resource this. At 1430hrs an evaluator noted that the Operations Function had limited experience in using SARTrack and were unable to load it on their computers.

The use of diverse systems across the SAR districts and SAR groups resulted in a lack of standardisation and interoperability. The attempt to establish a COP utilising SARTrack, faced implementation challenges, with limited accessibility for majority of the IMT. The presence of an SME helped with system setup but did not address the broader issues of team proficiency in using the system.

Figure 7 SARTrack display for the IMT. Photo taken at 1514hrs



Comment: Identify and adopt a nationally consistent Incident Management System for a Common Operating Picture for Search and Rescue Operations. This will eliminate confusion and enhance coordination. Provide comprehensive training to ensure IMT are proficient in using the selected system.

**KPI 30:** Appropriate and timely reports are provided within command structures, and to coordinating authorities. **Partially met.**

At no point was a status report or updates from Functions considered. Verbal updates were provided by certain Functions during IMT meetings but not documented. The absence of status reports indicates a lack of regular and timely reporting within the IMT. The situation report in development at 1415hrs suggests an attempt to provide information, but lack of contingency or long-term planning in the report raises concerns. Failure to communicate this information to the Coordinating Authority and stakeholders further diminishes the effectiveness of reporting structures.

NYC

**NEW ZEALAND  
SEARCH  
RESCUE**  
Rapu Whakarauroa Aotearoa

## SITUATION REPORT

Operation name: WHAKARAUROA TANGATA	Time:
Prepared by:	Date: 18/11/23
Location: LAKE TE ANAU, SOUTH ARM ENTRANCE	Map/chart ref:

**Situation:** AT 0705LRS THE SILVER PACIFIC II CALLED PAN PAN, LOSING POWER 0727 VESSEL CAN ACROUND AND CALLED MAYDAY. ON BOARD WERE 144 PAX 112 CREW, TOTAL 256 COASTGUARD, SCS, HELO & LSAR ASSETS DEPLOYED ALONG WITH NZDF

**Action taken by responders and others:**  
WATER AIR AND LAND ASSETS DEPLOYED.  
RESCUE ONGOING WITH STABLE WEATHER CONDITIONS  
ALL SEARCH ASSETS HAVE BEEN RECOVERING MULTIPLE PERSONS

**Factors impacting on planning:**  
+ STAFFING BREAKS & ROTATIONS.  
+ ENSURING SUFFICIENT FUEL RESERVE  
+

**Contingencies and long term planning:**

Figure 8 Situation Report as at 1415hrs

**Objective Seven: Agencies appropriate to the scenario demonstrate their deployment capabilities for their role in the SAREX.**

This objective was partially met. The coordination of agency responses was partially met (KPI 31), with support agencies utilising their command structures and following their SOPs within mandated frameworks. However, the IMT lacked oversight on agency roles and responsibilities, leading to challenges in achieving a fully integrated and coordinated response. The recommendation emphasises the need for support agencies to develop relationships, understand each other's mandates, and enhance collaboration for positive outcomes in future operations. SAR field teams demonstrated successful deployment with appropriate resources and performed to the standard of their specialties (KPI 34). However, the timely deployment of SAR teams was only partially met (KPI 32) due to the exercise's setup, making it challenging for the IMT to deliver taskings promptly (KPI 33). The lack of lead-in time and a Common Operating Picture within the IMT affected situational awareness and tasking operationalisation. While field teams effectively managed well-being, including fatigue, throughout the exercise (KPI 36), their alignment with the IAP was not met (KPI 35). The incomplete nature of the IAP likely led to challenges in providing clear guidance and

expectations for field teams.

In summary, while there were successes in agency deployment capabilities and field team performance, the IMT faced challenges in coordination, timely deployment, and tasking alignment. The recommendation (Recommendation Five) emphasised the importance of multi-agency training sessions to familiarise personnel with agency capabilities, mandates, and foster collaboration for more effective multi-agency response efforts in the future.

**KPI 31: Agency response is coordinated. Partially met.**

Most support agencies utilised their command structure and followed their SOPs within their mandated frameworks. The coordination aspect was only partially met due to lack of oversight from the IMT on agencies roles, responsibilities and function within the operation. It was observed that separate systems and tools led to challenges in achieving a fully integrated and coordinated response. It is encouraged that these support agencies continue to develop relationships and understand each others mandates and capabilities. This will lead to positive outcomes for future operations.

**KPI 32: SAR field teams deploy with appropriate resources to undertake expected tasks. Met.**

SAR teams were deployed in accordance with established Service Level Agreements and mandates, ensuring that they were equipped with the appropriate resources needed to fulfil their expected taskings. The Logistic Function worked closely with Safety Function and field Team Leaders to ensure equipment and resources were provided.

**KPI 33: SAR teams are deployed in a timely manner. Partially met.**

Due to the setup of the exercise, it was difficult for the IMT to deliver taskings in a timely manner. The majority of taskings were reflex due to the exercise size, with teams ready to deploy by 0800hrs and the IMT set up at 0700hrs.

The lack of lead-in time made it challenging for the IMT to gain situational awareness for taskings to be planned and operationalised for deployment. Additionally, the lack of a Common Operating Picture in the IMT became apparent at 1336hrs, with Operations and Logistics Functions being unaware of the number and status of SAR teams in the field.

**KPI 34: Field teams perform to the standard of their speciality. Met.**

SAR field teams at a tactical level are well-practiced, and teams kept within their scope, demonstrating interagency cooperation. Teams demonstrated proficiency and competence in their respective fields. They adhered to their scope of practise, ensuring the operated within the bounds of their experience and expertise.

**KPI 35: Field teams undertake taskings in line with IAP. Not met.**

The incomplete nature of the IAP led to the natural failure of teams to adhere to the plan. The lack of an action plan likely led to challenges in providing clear guidance and expectation for field teams.

**KPI 36: Field teams manage welfare, including fatigue throughout the exercise. Met.**

Field teams demonstrated effective management of welfare, considering factors such as fatigue, exposure, and sustenance. The presence of a Safety Manager overseeing briefings reflects a proactive approach to health, safety and well-being management. At 1404hrs the Response Manager and SLSNZ LO made decision to withdraw SLSNZ IRB teams from the field as the weather was deteriorating and fatigue identified as a potential factor.

**Recommendation Five: Conduct multi-agency training sessions and exercises on a frequent basis to familiarise personnel with agency capability mandates. This approach will foster a comprehensive understanding of each agency's role and responsibilities, facilitating collaboration and coordination during multi-agency response efforts.**



## 6. Conclusions

The evaluation reveals a mixed performance in meeting the objectives set out for the 2023 Southern District SAREx – Whakarauora Tangata. While some aspects demonstrated success, such as the effective SAR field teams and the management of health, safety and wellbeing, significant shortcomings were identified in critical areas.

Clear mission and objectives were not consistently set, and the Initial Action Plan lacked essential elements. Planning processes and CIMS functions were established, but lack of CIMS 3<sup>rd</sup> knowledge and visibility hindered effective implementation.

Control structures were established, but issues arose in resource tracking, and consultation with support agencies was lacking. Operational risks were identified and analysed effectively, demonstrating a proactive approach. However, challenges in communication systems and inadequate utilisation of the intelligence cycles affected information management.

While most support agencies utilised their command structures appropriately, coordination oversight and the lack of unified system led to challenges in achieving a fully integrated and coordinated response.

Personnel involved in the IMT Functions engaged in introspective reflection despite the challenges and potentially discouraging aspects of the exercise. The ability to identify lessons suggests a proactive approach to learning and improvement. The exercise, despite its difficulties, provided a valuable opportunity for personnel to learn and develop their practise. Reflective practises contribute to organisation resilience and the continuous improvement of emergency response capabilities in the SAR sector.

To maximise the impact of lessons learned, it is crucial to systematically integrate them into future training programs, regularly review and update response protocols, foster a culture of continuous improvement, include reflective practices in after-action reviews, promote communication of findings across teams, and establish a centralized database for lessons learned. By adhering to these practices, organizations can cultivate a dynamic learning environment and enhance their emergency response capabilities over time.

The SAREx demonstrated successes in certain aspects, but critical deficiencies in planning, coordination and the information management highlight the need for comprehensive training, standardised processes, and improved collaboration among agencies involved in SAROps.

## Appendix: Key Performance Indicators

This appendix lists the objectives and key performance indicators being used for evaluation of the exercise.

Met: The evaluation criteria were met in all instances – Partially Met: The evaluation criteria was met in some instances, but were incomplete tasks associated with these evaluation criteria – Not Met: The evaluation criteria was not met in any instance.

<b>Objective 1. Develop an effective action plan to manage the OSC and regional response to a Nationally significant SAR incident.</b>	
<b>Key Performance Indicators</b>	<b>Evaluator Comment</b>
Clear Mission and Objectives are set for each operational period	<b>Not met. By 0821hrs clear mission set in GSMEAC but no objectives. IAP had not been considered until prompted.</b>
Planning processes and CIMS functions are as established in the IMT.	<b>Partially met. CIMS function managers were appointed in timely manner and personnel were allocated to functions. There was no reference to the “Planning P” model or a CIMS 3<sup>rd</sup> edition guide observed in the IMT. Desk “functions on a page” prompts were available but underutilised.</b>
The action plan is phased in accordance with requirements/taskings from the Coordinating Authority.	<b>Not met. Action Plan incomplete – Objective not SMART. No strategy or actions recorded 1128hrs – IAP partially filled, no mission – lists under objectives -no strategies or actions documented. 1354hrs – mission added to IAP, listed objectives no strategies or action recorded</b>
Risk mitigations measures for likely threats and associated consequences are embedded in the action plan.	<b>Partially met. Safety function developed generic plan to be incorporated into taskings. Safety Manger briefed TL before each tasking. Safety board present and in full view for the IMT and people entering the facility Safety not considered as part of an action plan – IAP not completed.</b>
Relevant support agencies are integrated into action planning processes.	<b>Not met. Support agencies not consulted as IAP not developed Recommendation: Ensure all personnel involved in SAR IMT are adequately trained in CIMS 3<sup>rd</sup> edition. CIMS is an integral part of incident management and enables personnel to respond effectively to incidents through appropriate coordination across functions and agencies.</b>

<b>Objective 2 Coordinate the interagency response to the nationally significant SAR incident in accordance with the Coordinating Authority plan and tasking.</b>	
<b>Key Performance Indicators</b>	<b>Evaluator Comment</b>
Appropriate control structures are established in suitable locations; for example, a forward ICP, a main ICP and IMT	<b>Met. CIMS terminology used including incident operations, safe forward point, assembly area. However, the staging area could have been located at a more appropriate facility.</b>
Support and/or resources/effect required from other agencies are identified and requested.	<b>Partially met. 200 personnels across 14 agencies present. Lack of communication within the IMT led to confusion when assets were ready for re-tasking, this resulted in a number of teams having to “hurry up and wait” when their skills should have been utilised. At 1336hrs Logistics and Operations had lost sight of how many teams had been deployed and were currently in the field. At 1330hrs a briefing to the District Commander by the IC was conducted. IC was unable to confirm number of personnel deployed on the water and land, number of pax recovered and their current status or location.</b>
Liaison arrangements are maintained as required throughout the duration of the response.	<b>Met. A good representation of LOs in the IMT</b>
Response is managed in accordance with plans and within mandated frameworks.	<b>Not met. Planning was focused on reflex tasking (which was appropriate for the initial response). However, when prompted was evident that SOPs were not being followed and new verbal plans were being followed but not clarified and were ad hoc. (This alludes to one of two things – 1) plans were not fit-for-purpose or previously tested, or 2) the plans had not been made clear to the personal executing them, therefor more training needs to be conducted in understanding process and procedures. No plans were evident or recorded during the exercise. Exception to this was St John, TWO Southern, AREC and Red Cross who worked within their mandated frameworks and could provide evidence of this when prompted. Recommendation: Practise and review plans on a frequent basis. Ensure all personnel are aware and trained in these plans and mandated frameworks.</b>
The response is managed using a CIMS framework.	<b>Not met. Inconsistency of CIMS used – evident that there was a lack of awareness of CIMS other than the main functions. Example – Ops did not step up an investigation arm, PIM was not considered until 1141hr IMT Meeting, Intel was only had two personnel allocated to the function</b>

	<p>and were not utilising an Information Collection Plan until prompted (at 1136hrs only had one requirement noted).</p> <p>Confusion between Planning and Ops as to who responsible for a demobilisation plan. Functions working in silos instead of working together.</p> <p>Lack of task planning teams to troubleshoot issues and aid planning in areas they were overwhelmed with.</p> <p>Key role holders lacked the experience or leadership for the required fellowship and delivery of product. Inexperienced personnel were given Function Manager roles with a more experienced person imbedded into the function as a mentor. These function managers were often left to their own devices and felt they had been set up to fail.</p> <p>Majority of the IMT function personnel were unidentifiable with only the function leads wearing CIMS vests.</p> <p>At 1300hrs the operational rhythm within the IMT was nil with no energy or product being delivered.</p> <p>Recommendation: Enhance leadership capabilities within the IMT. Empower key role holders with targeted leadership development opportunities. This will enable them to identify uncertainty, provide strong mentorship, and ensure successful delivery of outputs.</p>
Personnel work in a collaborative manner with colleagues from other agencies.	Partially met. Interagency collaboration was maintained but silos within the IMT became evident early on. This led to push back on responsibility and confusion between roles later on.
Future requirements beyond the immediate response, together with associated resource/aligned agency are identified and communicated.	Not met. This was not identified. Reflex taskings was made a priority. No long-term planning, contingency planning, or transition planning was considered. There was no Demobilisation Plan or handover considerations until tasked by the Police District Commander at 1330hrs. No formal briefing was documented with exception to the original GSMEAC, and no planning or resources requirements considered for the second operational period. A rāhui was considered and discussions with local iwi representation and the IC took place. This consideration was a positive interaction within the IMT.
<b>Objective 3. Establish and manage a robust reconciliation and registration process.</b>	
<b>Key Performance Indicators</b>	<b>Evaluator Comment</b>
The information needs for reconciliation are identified.	Not met. Information Collection Plan was not considered as of 0913hrs. First item recorded was at 1136hrs (see photos), 4 hours after IMT set-up. Welfare/Reconciliation team worked in silos on this and the rest of

	<p>the IMT were unaware of process. At the 0958hr IMT Meeting Welfare/Recon were not asked for an update. At the 1041hr IMT Meeting there was no representation from Welfare/Recon. This made it difficult for intel to understand the needs required.</p>
<p>Key activities required for effective reconciliation are identified, and clear processes and procedures established.</p>	<p>Not met. see previous comment. At 1141 IMT Meeting the numbers from Recon were inconsistent with St John, Intell and Recon giving different numbers.</p> <p>Initial modelling was for CDEM to register the passengers on receipt utilising and ArcGIS Survey123 system. St John had a simple tracking process, receiving persons and providing them with a number that was recorded on triage form which then accompanied the patient. Their number was also written on their hand. After some consideration from Police and CDEM, the st john numbering system was adopted and 78 pax EOD total) were recorded and tracked. This was done using a Google Doc spreadsheet (major red flags around privacy, security, storing and transfer of information which goes against the Privacy Act 2020 and DIA recommendations and the National Security System Handbook).</p> <p>The information was formally transferred between police at the registration area and intel at 30 minute intervals, from around 1300hrs. When Intell were queried (at 1401hrs) as to the location of the 76 recovered pax, they could only articulate the location of 65.</p>
<p>Appropriate space and logistics support is allocated to enable key activities to be undertaken.</p>	<p>Partially met. Logistics was not consulted in the Reconciliation process from observations. Welfare/Recon worked in isolation and managed resources between support agencies.</p> <p>St John and Red Cross established sites with their existing resources. Police and CDEM utilised these relationships, established sites and resources to implement a registration and reconciliation process.</p>
<p>Triage and welfare needs are prioritized.</p>	<p>Partially met. triage system robust and comprehensive – unsure of welfare needs</p> <p>ArcGIS Survey123 was the intended system. However, at an early stage it was felt that this was too extensive for exercise purposes, and a simple GoogleDoc spreadsheet was developed. Spreadsheet allowed for capture of personal identity but no subsequent welfare follow-up. A total of 6 pax Needs Assessment were included in the Survey123 system.</p> <p>The logistics team had prioritised accommodation needs for displaced</p>

	<p>passengers but it was unclear what other welfare needs were present or tended to since the GoogleDoc did not record this and the Survey123 data was incomplete.</p> <p><b>Recommendation:</b> Ensure all personnel involved in registration and NA process are competent in the SOPs. Practise and review plans on a frequent basis. Ensure all personnel are aware and trained in these plans and mandated frameworks.</p>
A clear process to hand personnel over to the appropriate agency/organization for onward movement and recovery is established.	<b>Not Met.</b> No formal process was established between Police, CDEM, or the ships agent, other than accommodation requirement considerations which does not constitute recovery under CIMS 3 <sup>rd</sup> ed. Process completed but not clear. Recovery not a consideration.
A single point of truth to show reconciliation progress is maintained throughout.	<b>Not met.</b> IMT meeting at 1141hrs had Intel, Recon and St John providing different numbers in their updates. <p><b>Recommendation:</b> A nationally consistent reconciliation process needs to be developed and communicated. It should incorporate a multi-agency response with consultation and input from lead and support agencies.</p>
<b>Objective 4. IMT effectively identifies and mitigates associates risks.</b>	
<b>Key Performance Indicators</b>	<b>Evaluator Comment</b>
Operational risks, both actual and potential, are identified and analysed.	<b>Met.</b> Safety Manager followed appropriate processes and provided overall operations with well documented and well managed Safety considerations.
Risk management systems and processes appropriate to the nature and complexity of the situation are defined.	<b>Met.</b> additional safety support would have been beneficial to size and scale of this exercise.
Briefing information appropriately addresses identified risks.	<b>Met.</b> Safety Manager briefed TL before each tasking
All participants understand their personal responsibilities regarding risk.	<b>Partially Met.</b> An incident was identified where Land SAR members boarded a SLSNZ IRB without lifejackets. This was not noticed until after the IRB has cast off. They were returned to shore and this safety breach was rectified.
<b>Objective 5. Establish SAR communication infrastructure.</b>	
<b>Key Performance Indicators</b>	<b>Evaluator Comment</b>
Communication lines between IMT and field teams operate effectively.	<b>Partially met.</b> Comms plan identified black spots and was conveyed to IMT and teams. AREC managed the comms side of the exercise as per their SOPs. SLSNZ utilised their own system but this was managed within the IMT which was separate to the AREC comms location. This

	<p>caused some confusion but was rectified with a LO being implemented to support the comms.</p> <p>Communication from a dissemination perspective saw that teams in the field were unsure of scenario and had no information on why they were present until tasking occurred. Situational Awareness was not available to teams waiting for taskings.</p>
Communication systems are operational in a timely manner.	<b>Met.</b> AREC followed developed a Communication Plan which was available to the IMT
Communication systems remain operational throughout the response period.	<b>Met.</b> Communications were efficient for the scenario. Particular black spots had been identified and teams were deployed with PLBs and Inreaches in case a No Duff situation occurred while in a black spot. Cell phone reception was available for majority of the exercise area.
<b>Objective 6. Information is effectively managed and communicated during the response to ensure situational awareness across all stakeholders.</b>	
<b>Key Performance Indicators</b>	<b>Evaluator Comment</b>
The intelligence cycle is used to ensure information is subjected to a robust assessment process and decision makers are provided with high quality and credible intelligence.	<p><b>Not met</b> – the intell cycle was not utilised. A “Found Items Register” was visible for the IMT and one job sheet was displayed. A timeline was present at the front of the IMT which was managed by the Controllers Assistant.</p> <p>An “information collection” was displayed for the IMT which was a list of persons recovered and persons deceased – not consistent with the CIMS information collection definition.</p>
All stakeholders are identified and consulted with in a timely manner.	<b>Partially met.</b> It took time for the IMT to identify who the stakeholders were and how they fit into the IMT. Stakeholder considerations who did not have representation at the exercise were not considered. Example; community, DOC, MFAT, FN etc
Information is shared and relayed appropriately within the IMT and across agencies - briefings are conducted on a regular basis.	<b>Partially met.</b> Briefings were conducted hourly, but an operation schedule was not present in the IMT. A bell was rung to indicate when an IMT meeting was taking place and for any briefings within the IMT. No agenda was presented and updates were given in an ad hoc manner. If a function had not provided an update, they were not pressed on the matter. No summery of actions was presented at the end of each meeting or briefing and GSMEAC was only utilised once in an IMT meeting.
Information requirements for next operational period are established and action taken to address these needs	<b>Not met.</b> This was not a consideration for the IMT. The “Police District Commander” prompted this in a pressing manner but it was not followed up.

There is a clear understanding of a common operating picture across agencies, and this is regularly updated.	<p><b>Not met.</b> Each SAR district within the Southern District use their own systems which created confusion in the IMT. The SARTrack system log was utilised for a COP with a SME being present to ensure the system was set up and running. However, majority of the IMT were unable to access this system, or were unsure how to use it.</p> <p><b>Recommendation:</b> Identify a nationally consistent Incident Management System to form a Common Operating Picture that is intuitive and can be utilised for multi-agency Operations.</p>
Appropriate and timely reports are provided within command structures, and to coordinating authorities.	<p><b>Partially met.</b> No status reports were provided. Situation Report was in development at 1415hrs but no contingency or long term planning had been considered. At no time was this sent to Coordinating Authorities or support agencies.</p>
<p><b>Objective 7. Agencies appropriate to the scenario demonstrate their deployment capabilities for their role in the SAREX.</b></p>	
<b>Key Performance Indicators</b>	<b>Evaluator Comment</b>
Agency response is coordinated.	<p><b>Partially met.</b> Majority of the support agencies utilised their command structure and followed their SOPs within their mandated frameworks.</p>
SAR field teams deploy with appropriate resources to undertake expected tasks.	<p><b>Met.</b> Teams were tasked as per Service Level Agreements and respective mandates.</p>
SAR field teams deploy in a timely manner.	<p><b>Partially met.</b> Due to the set-up of the exercise, it was difficult for IMT to deliver taskings in a timely manner. Majority of the taskings were reflex due to the size of the exercise and wanting to ensure participants time was utilised well. Teams were ready to deploy by 0800hrs and the IMT was set up at 0700hrs. The lead in time made it difficult for IMT to gain situational awareness for taskings to be planned and operationalised for deployment. Due to lack of COP in the IMT it became apparent at 1336hrs that IMT were unaware how many teams were in the field and what teams were awaiting taskings.</p>
Field teams perform to the standard of their specialty.	<p><b>Met.</b> Field teams at a tactical level are well practised. Teams kept within their scope and interagency cooperation was evident.</p>
Field teams undertake taskings in line with IAP.	<p><b>Not met.</b> The IAP was incomplete.</p>
Field teams manage welfare, including fatigue throughout the exercise.	<p><b>Met.</b> Good example of team management was present throughout the day. Fatigue was a consideration. Safety Manager briefed teams prior to taskings to ensure health, safety and wellbeing we understood and managed.</p> <p><b>Response Manager</b> made the call to pull SLSNZ teams out of the field when it was suggested by their LO that they only had limited taskings in them and was going to be an issue.</p>






Figure 10 Planners briefing "passengers" at 2115hrs 17/11/23



Figure 9 Operations Team at 0833hrs

**JOB SHEET** 

Subject: *Data request*      Operation name:

Date/time: *08:03*      *Is the vessel a hazard? Ecological, environmental, fuels, oil, gas (e.g. LPG), hazardous substances (e.g. Chlorine, Ammonia), Sewerage? Anything that may compromise Rescue vessels in operation or persons & victims?*

Figure 11 Intel Job Sheet at 0803hrs

DUNEDIN RED CROSS - OPERATIONAL TASKINGS						RC27
1	Task Name	Assigned To	Status	Assigned To	Phone No.	
2	Task Name	Assigned To	Status	Assigned To	Phone No.	
3	Task Name	Assigned To	Status	Assigned To	Phone No.	
4	Task Name	Assigned To	Status	Assigned To	Phone No.	
5	Task Name	Assigned To	Status	Assigned To	Phone No.	
6	Task Name	Assigned To	Status	Assigned To	Phone No.	
7	Task Name	Assigned To	Status	Assigned To	Phone No.	
8	Task Name	Assigned To	Status	Assigned To	Phone No.	
9	Task Name	Assigned To	Status	Assigned To	Phone No.	
10	Task Name	Assigned To	Status	Assigned To	Phone No.	

Figure 12 Red Cross Teams Ops Log at 0909hrs

SAT, 18 NOVEMBER 2023

- 0707. PAN PAN - VESSEL SILVER PACIFIC II  
FROM SOUTH ISLAND - LAKE TE ANAU.  
APPROX 250 POB
- 0727  
Mayday call  
Lost power, run aground drifting  
N - 45 216.92  
E 167 345 901
- 0759 Weather Condition  
Cloudy thru out day Scattered Showers  
developing in afternoon  
Wind speed increasing from 6kmph to 19kmph Max  
by 1500 - Dying in afternoon  
Temp 4-16°C Water temp 14°C.  
Survivability 80% 1st hour 40% 4hours
- 08:15 Comms Plan  
Operations - ESB 60  
Team Simpler - ESY39 - triage  
Air Ops 119-1  
Emergency MM63 - No Cuff.  
Coastguard internal - MM06  
LSAR internal - ESK07
- 09:00 - Taking on Water - new muster numbers  
114 PAY  
112 Crew  
256 POB  
Vessel Trying to move to a safer location



Figure 14 IMT at 0722hrs

Figure 13 Timeline managed by Control Team at 0916hrs




Figure 15 Org Chart in the IMT

Figure 16 Tasking Form for Marine Asset at 0915hrs

Figure 17 Tasking form for LandSAR Team at 1021hrs



Figure 18 Casualty assessment 1108hrs



Figure 19 Red Cross, St John and Coastguard at 1156hrs